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ANNOUNCING REMEDIES FOR
MEDICAL INJURY: A PROPOSAL FOR
MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM BASED
ON THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
STEVEN E. RAPER, MD, JD
I. INTRODUCTION
From a patient‘s standpoint, change is needed in the current medical liability
system of compensation for medical injury. 1 Liability reform is embedded in the
DNA of the Obama Presidency, as initially shown by the President‘s two attempts
at reform. The first attempt was the creation of an Executive branch program for
liability reform prior to specific Congressional approval. 2 Second, a Legislative
branch provision in the landmark Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPACA) also acknowledges the need for liability reform. 3 With regard to the first
attempt, on September 9, 2009, President Obama directed the Secretary of Health
and Human Services (HHS) to establish a grants initiative to help states and health
care systems tie patient safety to medical liability reform, thus reducing preventable
injuries, enhancing communication between doctors and their patients, ensuring

Copyright © 2013 by Steven E. Raper.
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1. See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Reform of Medical Liability and Patient Safety: Are Health Courts
and Medicare the Keys to Effective Change?, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL‘Y 252, 257 (2006) (discussing
the deficiencies in different areas of malpractice policy); Donald J. Palmisano, Health Care in Crisis:
The Need for Medical Liability Reform, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL‘Y L. & ETHICS 371, 371 (2005) (stating
that a health care crisis exists in the United States and that the need for medical liability reform is great).
2. See Press Release, President Barack Obama, Demonstration Grants for the Development,
Implementation, and Evaluation of Alternatives to the Current Medical Liability System (Sept. 17,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-concerningmedical-liability-reform; see also Benjamin Grossberg, Uniformity, Federalism, And Tort Reform: The
Erie Implications of Medical Malpractice Certificate of Merit Statutes, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 220
(2010) (discussing a 2009 bill amendment that would have provided states with incentives to implement
medical liability reform).
3. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6801, 124 Stat. 119, 804
(2010) (―[H]ealth care reform presents an opportunity to address issues related to medical malpractice
and medical liability insurance . . . .‖).
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patients with medical injuries are compensated in a fair and timely manner,
reducing the incidence of frivolous lawsuits, and reducing liability premiums. 4
To implement this directive, in June 2010, the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality (AHRQ, a Sub-Agency of the Department of Health and
Human Services) announced $23.2 million in funding for seven demonstration
grants to operate through June 2013 and thirteen one-year planning grants.5 AHRQ
terminated funding opportunities for both the demonstration grants and planning
grants as of March 6, 2012.6 The funding opportunity was terminated because the
Agency has no further appropriated funds to support these grants. 7 In its place,
medical liability reform was addressed in a small but conceptually important part of
the recently affirmed PPACA as discussed below. 8
Why do both the Executive and Legislative branches of government feel
compelled to champion medical liability reform? Viewed from the perspective of
the patient, there are three major deficiencies in the way medical injury is currently
compensated. First, the current medical malpractice regime leads to degradation of
the physician-patient relationship. Second, it is the patient that is directly affected
by the practice of defensive medicine, or tests, procedures, and subspecialty
consults done to avoid lawsuits. Lastly, inefficiencies in the prevailing medical

4. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to a Joint Session of Congress on Health
Care (Sept. 9, 2009) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-thePresident-to-a-Joint-Session-of-Congress-on-Health-Care; see also AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE
RESEARCH & QUALITY, MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM AND PATIENT SAFETY INITIATIVE PROGRESS
REPORT 1 (2009), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/quality-patient-safety/patient-safetyresources/liability/medliabrep.pdf (summarizing the goals of the grants initiative).
5. See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, supra note 4, at 1. The demonstration
projects can be placed in three categories. Id. at 3. The first category, ―Preventing Harm Through Best
Practices,‖ seeks to improve care in clinical areas that frequently are the subject of a large number of
medical malpractice claims, testing whether implementing new ways to prevent medical injury can
simultaneously improve patient safety and reduce the number of malpractice lawsuits. Id. at 3–4. A
second category, ―Improving Communication With Patients,‖ seeks to test whether better
communication can lead to fewer lawsuits, fairer and faster compensation, and improved patient safety.
Id. at 3, 4–6. Lastly, one project, ―Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution,‖ is trying to improve
dispute resolution after a malpractice claim has been filed; through the use of an expanded and enhanced
―judge-directed negotiation‖ program in New York courts, coupled with a new hospital early disclosure
and settlement model. Id. at 3, 6–7.
6. Termination Notice for Two AHRQ FOA’s: PAR-11-023, Patient Safety and Medical Liability
Reform Planning Projects (R21) and PAR-11-025, Patient Safety and Medical Liability Reform
Demonstration Projects (R18), AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY (Mar. 6, 2012),
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-HS-12-008.html.
7. E-mail from Karen J. Migdail, Senior Policy Advisor, Agency For Healthcare Research &
Quality, to Steven E. Raper¸ Assoc. Professor of Surgery, University of Pa. Perelman Sch. of Med.
(Sept. 13, 2012, 14:31 EST) (on file with the author).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15 (2011) (authorizing the HHS Secretary to award grants to individual
states to develop, implement, and evaluate changes to their existing medical liability systems); see also
infra Part II.
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malpractice regime lead to underclaiming and undercompensation for the medically
injured as well as long delays between injury and case resolution. 9
Liability reform and the problems borne by patients can be ameliorated by a
Patient‘s Compensation program as discussed in this article. The Patient‘s
Compensation program proposed here is different than any of the proposals funded
under the original Obama initiative. There are two main features of the proposed
Patient‘s Compensation program. First is scheduling a defined set of injuries for
which there is consensus that medical care is the cause of the injury. Given the
generally accepted notion that faulty systems of care and not individual negligence
cause medical injury, it is not necessary for a patient to prove negligence, only that
the injury is one of those on the schedule. Further, the schedule of injuries is
stratified by severity, so that only meaningful injuries are compensated. The
conceptual model for the medical injury compensation schedule is the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. Second, to enhance patient safety and access to the
information patients need to know, the schedule of remedies for medical injury will
be announced.
Announcing remedies—ex ante determination and declaration of the precise
remedy—for injuries sustained as a result of medical care holds the promise of
three important patient benefits.10 First, there is greater equality; an injured
patient‘s right to compensation is not constrained by factors such as race,
socioeconomic status, or what a plaintiff‘s attorney would consider to be a
―valuable‖ case. Second, announcing remedies for medical injury holds the promise
of greater compliance with rules, such as those designed to enhance patient safety,
as well as decrease positive and negative defensive medicine behaviors. Lastly,
announcing such remedies decreases the costs of recovering from medical injury, or
hedonic adaptation. 11 Hedonic adaptation, or regaining the enjoyment of life, is an
important process for helping patients recover from injury. Plaintiffs‘ attorneys
arguing for hedonic damages frame disability as inherently and tragically limiting
the ability to enjoy life, impairing such recovery.
There are two basic approaches to improving the method by which patients
injured by medical care are compensated. The first approach is to apply various
reforms to tort-based medical malpractice, such as caps on pain and suffering, and
the second approach is to abandon negligence in favor of an administrative model.

9. See Catherine T. Struve, Doctors, the Adversary System, and Procedural Reform in Medical
Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 943, 944 (2004) (stating that the medical liability system in
the United States is flawed and results in both undercompensation and underclaiming).
10. See Samuel L. Bray, Announcing Remedies, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 753, 764–774 (2012)
(describing the three benefits of announcing remedies as ―more equality . . . , more compliance . . . , and
lower costs of telling‖).
11. See Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and
Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 748 (2007) (stating that hedonic damages go beyond pain and
suffering damages in compensating for limitations on quality of life).
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Although commentators have put forth many arguments both supporting and
opposing various forms of medical liability reform, they have proposed relatively
few models for its revision. This article will discuss an administrative approach to
liability reform different than any funded to date. Part II will explain the Affordable
Care Act‘s guidance in the development of State Demonstration Programs. Part III
will summarize the negative impact of the current medical liability regime of
patients who suffer medical injury. Part IV will address how a Patient‘s
Compensation program would ameliorate many of the problems with the current
approach to medical liability. Although modest in scope and ambition, such a novel
alternative to compensating medical injury is a viable and much needed option to
traditional tort reform.
II. PPACA PROVISIONS AND ALTERNATIVES TO CURRENT MEDICAL TORT
LITIGATION
Congress clearly senses that the current medical malpractice system needs
improvement, as noted in the Affordable Care Act‘s Sense of the Senate Regarding
Medical Malpractice.12 The United States Senate noted that the existing civil
litigation system could be improved with regard to patient safety, reduction of
medical errors, more efficient resolution of disputes, increased availability of
prompt, fair resolution of disputes, and access to liability insurance. 13 In enacting
the Affordable Care Act, Congress appears content to stay out of a leadership role
in creating meaningful reform, instead working through the States. 14
The Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C 280g et seq., was amended by
adding § 399V–4, State Demonstration Programs to Evaluate Alternatives to
Current Medical Tort Litigation.15 Selected provisions are worth noting in the
context of their strong adherence to a states-based emphasis on tort reform. The
amended section authorized the Secretary of HHS to award demonstration grants,
not to exceed a five-year period, to states for the development, implementation, and
evaluation of alternatives to current tort litigation for resolving disputes over
injuries allegedly caused by health care providers or health care organizations. 16
For purposes of funding such grants, Congress authorized $50 million dollars. 17
However, the funds have not been appropriated at the time of publication. 18 To be
12. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6801, 124 Stat. 119, 804
(2010) (stating that there is a need for medical liability reform).
13. Id. (stating that states should be incentivized to make changes to the current civil litigation
system in order to improve the medical liability system).
14. See id. (stating that the states should develop, implement, and evaluate changes to the medical
liability system).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15(a) (2011).
16. § 280g-15(a).
17. § 280g-15(k).
18. See E-mail from Karen J. Migdail, supra note 7.
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eligible for a demonstration program, states must show that an alternative to tort
litigation resolves disputes over medical injuries and reduces the rate of such
injuries by mining and analysis of data relevant to patient safety. 19 The alternative
should, additionally, improve liability insurance access; provide information
differentiating between the alternative and the existing liability system; ensure that
patients can leave the alternative procedure at any time; not conflict with State law;
and lastly, preserve the legal rights of the patient, including their access to the
State‘s legal system and ability to file a medical malpractice claim.20
Each state proposing a demonstration project is required to identify sources
from which claims would be compensated.21 The scope of the demonstration
project could be determined geographically, encompassing the entire state, or a
limited region, or could be based on an area defined by medical practice, providers
or health care organizations. 22 Jurisdiction, however, could not be based on a
specific patient population or payer.23 States would also need to determine how
patients would get notification that their medical care qualifies for the alternative,
and how patients could opt out of or quit participation. 24
States granted demonstration projects must report, annually, on the efficacy of
the demonstration project, the impact on patient safety, and the availability and cost
of malpractice insurance.25 HHS is also directed to submit to Congress a report
documenting, among other data, the effect of such demonstration projects on the
quality of care, the number and types of medical injuries, the time taken to resolve
disputes, and the availability and cost of malpractice insurance. 26 Further, an
evaluation of each state demonstration program is required, to include a number of
specific measures.27 Congress authorized the appropriation of $50,000,000 to carry

19. § 280g-15(c)(1)(A)–(B).
20. § 280g-15(c)(2).
21. § 280g-15(c)(3) (specifying that funding sources may be public, private, or a combination of the
two and encourages funding methods to provide financial incentives for activities that improve patient
safety, as well as compensation for plaintiffs).
22. § 280g-15(c)(4)(A).
23. Id.
24. § 280g-15(c)(4)(B) (stipulating that a patient‘s decision to participate in that alternative
program may be made at any time and may not be limited).
25. § 280g-15(e)(1).
26. § 280g-15(e)(2).
27. § 280g-15(g)(3). Measures include an analysis and comparisons on the basis of ―(a) the nature
and number of disputes over injuries allegedly caused by health care providers or health care
organizations; (b) the nature and number of claims in which tort litigation was pursued despite the
existence of an alternative; (c) the disposition of disputes and claims, including the length of time and
estimated costs to all parties; (d) the medical liability environment; (e) health care quality; (f) patient
safety in terms of detecting, analyzing, and helping to reduce medical errors and adverse events; (g)
patient and health care provider and organization satisfaction with the alternative and with the medical
liability environment; and (h) impact on utilization of medical services, appropriately adjusted for risk.‖
Id.
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out the State demonstration programs beginning in 2011 and continuing for five
fiscal years.28 Section 10608 also dealt briefly with medical malpractice by noting
that for purposes of the section, an ―individual, or an officer, governing board
member, employee, or contractor of a free clinic‖ who volunteers his or her
services at a free clinic will be deemed ―an employee of the Public Health Service
for a calendar year.‖29
III. PATIENTS ARE NOT WELL-SERVED BY THE PREVAILING MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE REGIME
Viewed from the perspective of the patient, there are three major problems
with the current medical malpractice regime: A) a degradation of the physicianpatient relationship, B) the practice of defensive medicine to avoid lawsuits, and C)
inefficiencies in the malpractice process leading to underclaiming and
undercompensation for the medically injured.30 Each of these problems can be
ameliorated by a Patient‘s Compensation program.
A. Degradation of the Physician-Patient Relationship
Physicians‘ fears of malpractice are disrupting a most venerated relationship,
that of physician and patient. One well-respected commentator likened medical
malpractice, through the eyes of physicians, to Melville‘s Moby Dick ―. . . evil,
ubiquitous, and seemingly immortal.‖31 Malpractice lawsuits attempt to hold
physicians and other health care providers individually or collectively responsible
for some medical injuries.32 The belief that ―[o]nce an injury happens, someone
bears the responsibility‖ is widely held.33 In a Pew Charitable Trust study of
Pennsylvania, liability concerns replaced doctors‘ ―previously ‗warm, fuzzy
relationship with patients‘ with hard-nosed scrutiny of the patient‘s
litigiousness . . . .‖34 Eighty-one percent of physicians in high-risk geographical
areas, and seventy-five percent of physicians in low-risk areas, surveyed during the
last Pennsylvania malpractice crisis responded that because of concerns about
malpractice liability, every patient was viewed as a malpractice suit waiting to

28. § 280g-15(k).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 233(o)(1) (2011).
30. See Theodore Eisenberg, The Empirical Effects of Tort Reform, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS (Jennifer Arlen ed., forthcoming Nov. 2013) (manuscript at 9–26), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2032740 (discussing problems with the current
medical malpractice regime).
31. George J. Annas, Doctors, Patients, and Lawyers — Two Centuries of Health Law, 367 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 445, 445 (2012).
32. See TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 113 (2005).
33. Id.
34. Michelle M. Mello et al., Caring for Patients in a Malpractice Crisis: Physician Satisfaction
and Quality of Care, 23 HEALTH AFFS. 42, 49 (2004).
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happen.35 Further, ninety-one percent of medical specialists believed that the
current medical malpractice system limits provision of the highest-quality medical
care.‖36 To maintain revenue, seventy-six percent of specialist physicians stated
that they were likely to increase patient volume. 37 The relationship between volume
and quality suggests that practices with a full patient load may have difficulty
caring for more patients without compromising quality. 38
Fears of being sued cause physicians to view the current system of medical
malpractice as damaging personally and professionally. 39 A nationwide survey of
physicians found high levels of concern about the ―dread risk‖ of malpractice
litigation in a variety of geographic areas, practice settings, and specialties.40
Physicians‘ fear of the litigation process has led to the emergence of a medical
malpractice stress syndrome. 41 Regardless of outcome, malpractice litigation has
personal consequences for physicians that include burnout and suicidal ideation. 42
Closed claims review of surgical malpractice claims has shown that most technical
and judgment errors occur during care provided by competent physicians, which
means that all physicians are at risk of being sued. 43 Physicians‘ fear of being sued
for malpractice is worsened by a lack of knowledge about the actual risk of being
named in a lawsuit; physicians responding to a survey estimated that one in five of
their colleagues will be sued in a given year, an estimate three times higher than
the actual closed claims rate in New York state.44
Physician mistrust and resistance of the malpractice paradigm is due in large
part to contemporary concepts of patient safety and error reduction approaches to

35. Id. at 48 tbl.3.
36. Id. at 49.
37. Id. at 50 tbl.3.
38. Id. at 50.
39. See Ian S. Metzler & John G. Meara, Medical Liability Reform: Evidence for Legislative and
Alternative Approaches, 97 BULL. AM. C. SURGEONS 6, 6 (2012).
40. See Emily R. Carrier et al. Physicians’ Fears of Malpractice Lawsuits Are Not Assuaged by
Tort Reforms, 29 HEALTH AFFS. 1585, 1591 (2010) (defining dread risk as the fear of an unlikely,
uncontrollable, and unpredictable event that triggers an irrational level of risk aversion).
41. See Jeffrey J. Segal & Michael Sacopulos, A Modified No-fault Malpractice System Can
Resolve Multiple Healthcare Deficiencies, 467 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 420, 421
(2008) (stating that frequency and length of litigation all contribute to whether a physician experiences
medical malpractice syndrome).
42. See Charles M. Balch et al., Personal Consequences of Malpractice Lawsuits on American
Surgeons, 213 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 657, 665 (2011); see also Susan Kreimer, Lawsuits Are Stressing
Docs, HOSPS. & HEALTH NETWORKS (Am. Hosp. Ass‘n, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2012, at 17
(suggesting that hospitals not prejudge physicians who are sued for malpractice due to the added stress
that it brings).
43. See F. Dean Griffen & Richard H. Turnage, Reviews of Liability Claims Against Surgeons:
What Have They Revealed?, 43 ADVANCES SURGERY 199, 208 (2009).
44. Ann G. Lawthers et al., Physicians’ Perceptions of the Risk of Being Sued, 17 J. HEALTH POL.
POL‘Y & L. 463, 468–69 (1992).
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the problem of medical injury that focus on ―fixing the system, not fixing blame.‖45
These adversarial and very personal claims against physicians occur despite
accumulating evidence that most errors are multifactorial, or ―systems‖ errors. 46
The conceptual leap made in the Institute of Medicine‘s landmark report To Err is
Human was the need to understand medical injuries as systems errors rather than
the negligent acts of individuals.47 Based largely on precepts gleaned from To Err,
intensive efforts on the part of health care organizations have decreased medical
injuries. One such effort was the national Five Million Lives Campaign. 48 A recent
Commonwealth Fund report provided ten case studies felt to hold promise for
further improving patient safety. 49 Critics note that annual surveys have
documented improvements in medical care and decreases in patient morbidity and
mortality, but such improvements have not been uniformly successful. 50 A decade
after To Err was released, much has been accomplished in making patients safer,
leading one eminent patient safety scholar to upgrade systemic efforts from a ―C+‖

45. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A
SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 179 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000).
46. See Selwyn O. Rogers et al., Analysis of Surgical Errors in Closed Malpractice Claims at 4
Liability Insurers, 140 SURGERY 25, 30 (2006) (finding that surgical errors often result from multiple
layers of failures rather than from individual physician error).
47. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., supra note 45, at 179
(addressing that one of the major issues in detecting and handling errors is the lack of collaboration
among health professionals in problem solving).
48. Protecting Five Million Lives From Harm, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT,
http://www.ihi.org/offerings/Initiatives/PastStrategicInitiatives/5MillionLivesCampaign/Pages/default.as
px (last visited Apr. 23, 2013). The 5 Million Lives Campaign, which had enrolled more than 2,000
hospitals, adapted each of the campaign‘s twelve interventions aimed at reducing infection, surgical
complication, medication errors, and other forms of unreliable care. Id. Eight states registered all of their
hospitals in the campaign, and eighteen states had over ninety percent of their hospitals participate. Id.
The campaign documented, among other signs of progress, that sixty-five hospitals in the program
avoided ventilator-associated pneumonia for a year or more, and thirty-five hospitals avoided central
line-associated bloodstream infection in at least one of their ICUs. Id. Enrolled Rhode Island hospitals
had a forty-two percent decrease in central-line associated bloodstream infections from 2006–2007, and
enrolled New Jersey hospitals reported a seventy percent reduction in pressure ulcers. Id.
49. DOUGLAS MCCARTHY & DAVID BLUMENTHAL, COMMONWEALTH FUND, COMMITTED TO
SAFETY: TEN CASE STUDIES ON REDUCING HARM TO PATIENTS (2006), available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2006/Apr/Committed%
20to%20Safety%20%20Ten%20Case%20Studies%20on%20Reducing%20Harm%20to%20Patients/923
_McCarthy_committed_to_safety_10_case_studies%20pdf.pdf.
50. See, e.g., HEALTH GRADES, FIFTH ANNUAL PATIENT SAFETY IN AMERICAN HOSPITALS STUDY
5 (2008), available at http://hg-article-center.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/a9/9a/3b64b
168487c86c30dc0986dc344/PatientSafetyInAmericanHospitalsStudy2008.pdf (finding that substantial
progress continues to be made; for example, 249 Distinguished Hospitals for Patient Safety achieved, on
average, forty-three percent less patient harm, and noting that while all hospitals do not achieve this
level, an additional 220,000 incidents and 37,000 deaths among hospitalized Medicare patients from
2004 to 2006 could potentially have been prevented).
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to a ―B-.‖51 Medical injuries continue to occur despite a decade of improvements in
patient safety; morbidity and mortality occur due to the ever more complex nature
of medical treatment.52
Balancing a systems-based approach resisting the natural tendency to blame
individuals for errors against accountability for blameworthy behavior is a recent
development. The mental model for patient safety in the first five years was ―no
blame and shame‖; a mantra that helped engage reluctant providers and
undoubtedly generated substantial progress towards improving patient safety. 53
Currently, it has become clear that consequences for failure to adhere to safety rules
need to be enhanced.54 One model for differentiating injuries due to systems errors
which should be managed with systems re-engineering from willful, blameworthy
acts is that of the just culture advocated by David Marx.55 Physicians have not yet
embraced sanctions against such acts even for willful violations of reasonable
safety standards such as hand hygiene. 56

51. See Robert M. Wachter, Patient Safety at Ten: Unmistakable Progress, Troubling Gaps, 29
HEALTH AFFS. 165, 172 (2010) (noting a stronger business case for focusing on patient safety due to
enhanced accreditation standards and error reporting requirements).
52. See KRISTIN REED & RICK MAY, HEALTH GRADES, EIGHTH ANNUAL PATIENT SAFETY IN
AMERICAN HOSPITALS STUDY 1–2 (2011), available at https://www.cpmhealthgrades.com/CPM/assets/
File/HealthGradesPatientSafetyInAmericanHospitalsStudy2011.pdf (reporting that from 2007 through
2009, 667,828 Medicare beneficiaries experienced 708,642 patient safety events and that such events
were associated with $7.3 billion of excess cost, and that Medicare patients sustaining at least one
patient safety event post-operatively had approximately a one-in-ten chance of dying as a result of the
event, with 79,670 in-hospital deaths occurring among patients who experienced patient safety events).
53. See ROBERT M. WACHTER, UNDERSTANDING PATIENT SAFETY 21 (2d ed. 2007) (noting that the
modern approach to the patient safety movement is more successful because it acknowledges that
humans err and allows for the creation of systems to prevent and catch such errors).
54. See Lucian L. Leape, New World of Patient Safety, 144 ARCHIVES SURGERY 394, 397 (2009)
(asserting that while individual unintended safety violations should not be punished, willfully failing to
use safe practices cannot continued to be tolerated); Donald Goldmann, System Failure Versus Personal
Accountability—The Case for Clean Hands, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 121, 123 (2006) (explaining that
specific safety practice violations should have consequences especially in cases where the hospital has
perfected a new system for patient safety).
55. DAVID MARX, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, PATIENT SAFETY AND THE ―JUST CULTURE‖: A PRIMER
FOR HEALTH CARE EXECUTIVES 5 (2001), available at http://www.safer.healthcare.ucla.edu/
safer/archive/ahrq/FinalPrimerDoc.pdf (discussing individual accountability and four behavioral
categories—human error, negligence, intentional rule violations, and reckless conduct—in describing
blameworthy conduct and the need for authorities to take disciplinary action to deter such conduct); see
also Allan S. Frankel et al., Fair and Just Culture, Team Behavior, and Leadership Engagement: The
Tools to Achieve High Reliability, 41 HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TRUST 1690, 1692–93 (2006) (defining a
just culture as one in which each individual is accountable for their own actions, but is not blamed for
work environment faults beyond their control).
56. See Robert M. Wachter & Peter J. Pronovost, Balancing ―No Blame‖ and Accountability in
Patient Safety, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1401, 1402 (2009) (commenting that physicians view themselves
as entrepreneurs rather than employees and that such notions result in weak enforcement of safety
standards or sanctions by peers in hospital settings).
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A Patient‘s Compensation model holds promise for improving the physicianpatient relationship by restoring trust, improving quality of care, and compensating
patients without regard to negligence. There is some empiric data to support this
contention. In the Swedish no-fault system, physicians participate personally in the
filing of sixty percent of claims.57 Physicians are committed to improving the safety
and well-being of patients. By placing the responsibility for eliminating medical
injury in the hands of the providers who care for patients, acceptance of an
administrative compensation regime would engender less animosity. 58 Less
physician defensiveness is noted in systems that do not require the patient to prove
negligent care.59 In the Virginia Neurological Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation program, over sixty physicians were able to avoid lawsuits and the
costs, both professional and personal, generally associated with legal proceedings. 60
Because the Virginia compensation program is no-fault, physicians are also able to
avoid being placed into a national database that monitors malpractice settlements,
the NPDB.61 Being reported to the NPDB is uniformly considered as a major
concern for practicing physicians; yet the American Medical Association believes
that such medical liability claims data is a poor indicator of quality. 62
In Florida, Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association
(NICA) payments help to fund benefits for children while prohibiting malpractice
litigation on covered claims; the substantial benefits of increased protection from
costly litigation and a resulting freedom to focus on patient care make full
participation in the NICA Plan a positive for many obstetricians. 63 Because NICA
covers the ―truly catastrophic claims‖ of obstetricians and gynecologists, all Florida
physicians, regardless of specialty, enjoy lower malpractice premiums than they
otherwise would.64

57. See David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Toward a Workable Model of ―No-Fault‖
Compensation for Medical Injury in the United States, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 230 (2001).
58. See Allen B. Kachalia et al., Beyond Negligence: Avoidability and Medical Injury
Compensation, 66 SOC. SCI. & MED. 387, 388 (2008) (noting that the administrative compensation
regime is based on injury avoidability rather than on practitioner negligence).
59. See MICHELLE M. MELLO ET AL., SYNTHESIS PROJECT, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE—UPDATE 1, 4
(2011), available at http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/reports/2011/rwjf70017.
60. JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT & REVIEW COMM‘N, VA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, REVIEW OF THE
VIRGINIA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM 33 (2003), available at
http://jlarc.virginia.gov/reports/Rpt284.pdf.
61. Id.
62. See National Practitioner Data Bank, AM. MED. ASS‘N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/
pub/physician-resources/legal-topics/business-management-topics/national-practitioner-data-bank.page
(last visited Apr. 23, 2013).
63. Non-Participating OBGYN’S, FLA. BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMP. ASSOC.,
http://www.nica.com/nonprt_obgyns/index.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2013).
64. Other Physicians, FLA. BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMP. ASSOC.,
http://www.nica.com/other_physicians/index.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2013).
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B. Patients Bear the Brunt of Positive and Negative Defensive Medicine
From the patient‘s point of view, medical tests, procedures, or specialty
consultations performed in attempts to decrease the risk of malpractice claims are
undesirable; such physician behavior is known as defensive medicine. 65 Defensive
medicine is thought to become more prevalent when physicians perceive
heightened malpractice risk.66 There are two different types of physician behaviors
which are considered defensive medicine; both types have the potential to
negatively impact the patient. Negative defensive medicine includes behaviors in
which physicians refuse to perform high risk procedures, enter high risk specialties,
or care for high risk patients. 67 Positive defensive medicine occurs when physicians
perform procedures and order tests or other services to reduce adverse outcomes,
deter patients from filing medical malpractice claims, or enhance documented
evidence that the physician is practicing standard of care, so that if, in the future,
legal action is initiated, liability can be pre-empted.68 None benefit the patient,
some may lead to harm, and all are attempts by individual physicians to decrease
the risk of being sued for malpractice.
1. Negative Defensive Behaviors
Specialized physicians‘ fear of lawsuits leads many to restrict the scope of
their practices to exclude high-risk services such as obstetrics and spine surgery,
and a smaller number of specialists are even discontinuing patient care or relocating
to states with lower malpractice costs. 69 There is data to support the assertion that
physicians engage in a number of types of negative defensive behavior; one wellstudied example of avoiding a high risk procedure is the decline in rates of vaginal

65. See David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in a
Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2609 (2005) (―Defensive medicine is a deviation
from sound medical practice that is induced primarily by a threat of liability.‖); OFFICE OF TECH.
ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PUB. NO. OTA-H-6O2, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 13 (1994) (defining defensive medicine as ―when doctors order tests, procedures, or
visits, or avoid high-risk patients or procedures, primarily (but not necessarily solely) to reduce their
exposure to malpractice liability‖).
66. See Studdert et al., supra note 65, at 2616.
67. See Daniel P. Kessler, Evaluating the Medical Malpractice System and Options for Reform, 25
J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 95 (2011) (noting that negative defensive medicine occurs when a physician refuses
to offer care to a patient despite a potential benefit).
68. See id. (noting that positive defensive medicine creates incentives for doctors to take too many
precautions); see also JACKSON HEALTHCARE, A COSTLY DEFENSE: PHYSICIANS SOUND OFF ON THE
HIGH PRICE OF DEFENSIVE MEDICINE IN THE U.S. 20 (2011), available at
http://www.Jacksonhealthcare.Com/Media/8968/Defensivemedicine_Ebook_Final.pdf (citing a 2009
survey quantifying the costs and impact of defensive medicine).
69. See Mello et al., supra note 34, at 44 (explaining that high liability risks and costs affect a
physician‘s relationship with his or her patient).
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birth after cesarean section (VBAC). 70 Since the 1990s, nationwide rates of VBAC
have decreased sharply and rates of cesarean section have increased sharply; both
trends are consistent with clinical behavior aimed at reducing obstetricians‘
exposure to malpractice litigation.71 Neurosurgery represents another discipline in
which spinal surgery procedures—perceived by neurosurgeons as one of a series of
―high-risk‖ procedures—are correlated with higher rates of litigation. 72 Lastly, the
decision by Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to deny payment
for services treating complications that could be ―reasonably prevented‖ has led to
concerns that hospitals may choose not to provide high-risk service lines or
procedures.73
In addition to the VBAC example noted above, other data exist to show that
physicians might perform cesarean sections out of fear of litigation regardless of
geographic area or liability climate. 74 Two well-designed studies have found that
greater malpractice risk—measured by premiums or claims frequency in the area—
was associated with a statistically significant increase in the incidence of cesarean
sections.75 Other studies have had mixed results, with some providing corroborating
evidence76 but others finding no difference in cesarean rates.77 One study even
70. See Richard N. Waldman, Together We Can Do Something Wonderful, 115 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 1116, 1118 (2010) (―Each one of us enters the labor and delivery room shouldering our
concern for our two patients and weighed down by the yoke of liability.‖); see also Carrier et al. supra
note 40, at 1587 (finding that physician malpractice concerns are ―pervasive‖ and ―vary across
specialties‖).
71. See Y. Tony Yang et al., Does Tort Law Improve the Health of Newborns, or Miscarry? A
Longitudinal Analysis of the Effect of Liability Pressure on Birth Outcomes, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 217, 218 (2012) (estimating that a $10,000 decrease in malpractice premiums would correspond
to approximately 6,000 fewer total cesarean sections and 1,600 more VBACs).
72. See Richard L. Rovit et al., Neurosurgical Experience with Malpractice Litigation: An Analysis
of Closed Claims Against Neurosurgeons in New York State, 1999 Through 2003, 106 J.
NEUROSURGERY 1108, 1109 (2007) (studying 280 New York state closed claims against insured
neurosurgeons and finding that spinal surgery cases had higher rates of litigation).
73. See Rocco Ricciardi et al., Surgeon Involvement in the Care of Patients Deemed to have
―Preventable‖ Conditions, 209 J. AM. COLL. SURGEONS 707, 710 (2009).
74. See MICHELLE M. MELLO, SYNTHESIS PROJECT, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPACT OF THE
CRISIS AND EFFECT OF STATE TORT REFORMS 5 (2006), available at https://folio.iupui.edu/bitstream/
handle/10244/526/no10_researchreport.pdf (reporting that three different studies have found that greater
malpractice risk was associated with slight increases in cesarean section incidence rates).
75. Lisa Dubay et al., The Impact of Malpractice Fears on Cesarean Section Rates, 18 J. HEALTH
ECON. 491, 509 (1999) (finding that physicians perform more cesarean deliveries for mothers of lower
socioeconomic status in response to greater malpractice claims risk); A. Russell Localio et al.,
Relationship Between Malpractice Claims and Cesarean Delivery, 269 JAMA 366, 371 (1993)
(demonstrating a positive connection between the odds of cesarean delivery and malpractice risk).
76. See, e.g., Darren Grant & Melayne McInnes, Malpractice Experience and the Incidence of
Cesarean Delivery: A Physician-Level Longitudinal Analysis, 41 INQUIRY 170, 184 (2004) (finding that
malpractice claims are associated with influencing practice behavior by physicians performing cesarean
deliveries); Steven M. Rock, Malpractice Premiums and Primary Cesarean Section Rates in New York
and Illinois, 103 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 459, 463 (1988) (finding that a difference in number of cesarean
deliveries may exist only if the difference in premiums are substantial).
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showed that non-economic damage caps (a marker of decreased malpractice
pressure) increased utilization of cesarean sections. 78
Although difficult to comprehensively analyze, there is also data to suggest
that physicians avoid practicing in states with high malpractice premiums. 79 In a
survey of resident physicians in rural Florida, 411 of 981 physicians decreased or
eliminated health care services due to liability costs. 80 The problem of rural flight
was also noted in a study correlating high malpractice rates with a per capita
decrease in rural doctors.81 Physicians also choose to avoid on-call duties due to
fears of being sued for malpractice; the American College of Surgeons and the
American Association of Neurologic Surgeons have reported that one-third of
survey respondents had been sued by emergency room patients. 82 One survey of
neurosurgeons showed that thirty-eight percent of respondents limit provision of
trauma services due to, inter alia, liability concerns.83
77. See, e.g., Michael Frakes, Defensive Medicine and Obstetric Practices, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 457, 480 (2012) (documenting no change in the rate of cesarean deliveries , but finding a
reduction in use of episiotomy with adoption of non-economic damage caps); Roger A. Rosenblatt et al.,
Tort Reform and the Obstetric Access Crisis: The Case of the WAMI States, 154 W.J. MED. 693, 699
(1991) (suggesting that declining obstetric care availability may be linked to the institution of significant
tort reforms), but see Laura-Mae Baldwin et al., Defensive Medicine and Obstetrics, 274 J. AM. MED.
ASS‘N 1606, 1609 (1995) (finding no association between malpractice experience and the use of
prenatal resources or cesarean deliveries by physicians).
78. Janet Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, First Do No Harm? Tort Reform and Birth Outcomes,
123 Q.J. ECON. 795, 825 (2008).
79. See, e.g., Scott E. Maizel, Maryland’s Surgical Workforce–2007: An In-Depth Analysis and
Implications for the Future, 208 J. AM. COLL. SURGEONS 454, 458 (2009) (explaining how physicians
are fleeing Maryland due to rising malpractice premiums); see also MASS. MED. SOC‘Y, PHYSICIAN
WORKFORCE STUDY 59 (2011) (reporting that approximately half of specialists and primary care
physicians and approximately one-third of pediatricians have altered patient care as a result of their
perceived risk of litigation); Erin P. Fraher, Location, Location, Location: North Carolina Faces a
Shortage of Primary Care and Specialty Practitioners in Rural and Underserved Counties, 68 N.C.
MED. J. 196, 197 (2007) (reasoning that significant anecdotal evidence shows that fewer physicians in
North Carolina are delivering babies due to rising malpractice rates); KY. INST. OF MED., TASK FORCE
REPORT: COMPREHENSIVE STATEWIDE PHYSICIAN WORKFORCE STUDY 21 (2007), available at
http://www.kyiom.org/pdf/KMAWorkforceReport9-24-07.pdf (noting that while there is little research
to support the claim, malpractice claims are believed to be an important factor in motivating physicians
to retire early).
80. Robert G. Brooks et al., Impact of the Medical Professional Liability Insurance Crisis on
Access to Care in Florida, 164 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2217, 2218–19 (2004) (documenting
elimination of services as greatest among general surgeons (78.6%) and surgical specialists (73.6%)).
81. See Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, The Effect of Malpractice Liability on the Delivery
of Health Care, 8 F. HEALTH ECON. & POL‘Y 1, 19 (2005) (documenting a one percent decrease in per
capita rural physicians and a two percent decrease in older rural physicians for every ten percent
increase in malpractice premiums).
82. DIV. OF ADVOCACY & HEALTH POLICY, AM. COLL. OF SURGEONS, A GROWING CRISIS IN
PATIENT ACCESS TO EMERGENCY SURGICAL CARE 1, 7 (2006), available at http://www.facs.org/ahp/
emergcarecrisis.pdf.
83. Thomas R. Russell, The Surgical Workforce: Averting a Patient Access Crisis, 87 SURGICAL
CLINICS N. AM. 797, 802 (2007).
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2. Positive Defensive Behaviors
The conventional behavior described as defensive medicine has also been
called positive defensive behavior.84 Teasing out the effect of malpractice risk on
physician behavior can be difficult because physicians may have more than one
rationale for ordering a test, referral, or procedure; the desire to avoid malpractice
claims as well as the intention to see that the patient receives an accurate diagnosis
and correct treatment regardless of cost. 85 The Office of Technology Assessment‘s
comprehensive study on Defensive Medicine and Medical Malpractice stated the
problem bluntly: ―accurate measurement of the extent of this phenomenon is
virtually impossible.‖86 As a result, it has been hard to determine the pervasiveness,
cost, and consequences of defensive assurance behavior, and yet, a number of
commentators have made such estimates.
A 2003 survey of high-risk specialists in Pennsylvania found that ninety-three
percent reported that they sometimes or often engaged in at least one of six positive
defensive behaviors.87 Using data on Medicare spending for Part A and Part B
services and hospitals‘ total expenditures, reductions in the cost of medical liability
were found to lower health care expenditures. 88 Several types of medical liability
reform lowered health plan costs offered by self-insured employers due in part to
decreases in malpractice premiums.89
States enacting tort reforms such as caps on medical malpractice damages
experienced slower growth in expenditures for elderly patients admitted with heart
disease.90 Kessler and McClellan, in a much discussed early study, studied the
relationship of medical liability and health care expenditures for acute myocardial

84. See Studdert et al., supra note 65, at 2616.
85. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, supra note 65, at 13.
86. Id. at 4.
87. Studdert et al., supra note 65, at 2612. Assurance behaviors studied included: ordering more
diagnostic tests than were medically indicated; unnecessary referrals to specialists; prescribing more
medications than were medically indicated; and suggesting unnecessary invasive procedures such as
biopsies to confirm diagnoses. Id. at 2612–13. Physicians who were not confident about the adequacy of
their liability coverage and physicians who perceived their insurance premiums to be very burdensome
were significantly more likely to report these behaviors. Id.
88. See Katherine Baicker et al., Malpractice Liability Costs and the Practice of Medicine in the
Medicare Program, 26 HEALTH AFFS. 841, 850 (2007) (reporting that states in the bottom quartile of
malpractice payments per physician had lower payments from Medicare when compared to states in the
top quartile).
89. See Ronen Avraham et al., The Impact of Tort Reform on Employer-Sponsored Health
Insurance Premiums 16–17 (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15371, 2009),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15371 (studying different medical liability reforms and
finding that three out of four types of studied reforms resulted in a statistically significant decrease in
health plan costs).
90. Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine? 111 Q.J. ECON.
353, 373 (1996).
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infarction and ischemic heart disease in a Medicare population. 91 The analysis
showed that direct liability reforms—those with caps on damage awards, punitive
damages, mandatory prejudgment interest, or collateral source rule—reduced
hospital expenditures by between five and nine percent. 92
The Kessler/McClellan study used Medicare claims data to examine whether
patients in states without tort reforms received more health care services than
patients with the same diagnoses in states that had such reforms; hypothesizing that
the difference would approximate defensive medicine behaviors. 93 This study has
been somewhat controversial because the authors attempted to extrapolate national
defensive-medicine costs from these two diagnoses. 94 The study‘s findings are
probably not generalizable to all conditions or all patients, but its estimates for the
two diseases for which data were analyzed appear statistically accurate. It has been
suggested on reanalysis of the Kessler/McClellan data that medical management
does a better job of reducing overuse of costly and invasive medical technology. 95
Similar evidence of positive defensive behaviors have been documented in
order rates for imaging studies, such as mammograms for breast cancer screening
and computed tomograms for neurologic injury. Rates of screening mammography
were shown to increase significantly in the setting of increased malpractice
awards.96 Compared to states without medical liability reform laws, states with
laws that limited monetary damages, ―mandated periodic award payments . . . . or
specified collateral source offset rules‖ had an approximately forty percent lower
likelihood of imaging to assess neurologic injury. 97 A survey performed by the
Massachusetts Medical Society showed that physicians‘ liability concerns directly
impacted patients, and defensive testing and referrals cost in excess of $280 million
per year.98 Further, professional liability concerns had a substantial effect on the
scope of physicians‘ practices with thirty-eight percent of physicians reducing the

91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 354.
Id. at 378–79.
Id. at 354–55.
See CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, CRITIQUE OF OCTOBER 9, 2009, CBO LETTER TO
SENATOR HATCH ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ISSUES 6 (2009) (referring to it as ―the Long-Disputed
Kessler McClellan Study‖ and pointing out that the General Accountability Office criticized the study
because its findings were too narrow to be extrapolated to the general practice of medical practice).
95. See BAKER, supra note 32, at 131–32 (arguing that the study underestimated the effectiveness
of medical management techniques in reducing expenses).
96. Baicker & Chandra, supra note 81, at 20–21 (documenting a four percent increase in
mammography for every ten percent increase in the average malpractice award).
97. Rebecca Smith-Bindman et al., Diagnostic Imaging Rates for Head Injury in the ED And 4
States’ Medical Malpractice Tort Reforms, 29 AM. J. EMERGENCY MED. 656, 660 (2011).
98. MASS. MED. SOC‘Y, INVESTIGATION OF DEFENSIVE MEDICINE IN MASSACHUSETTS 1, 6–7
(2008).
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number of high risk services and twenty-eight percent of physicians reducing the
number of high-risk patients they saw.99
In summary, although methodological challenges make it unlikely that there
will ever be a completely accurate picture of the extent of defensive medicine, the
studies cited above find that defensive behaviors exist. 100 The Congressional
Budget Office recently concluded that ―the weight of the empirical evidence now
demonstrates a link between tort reform and the use of health care services.‖ 101 But
arguments about whether or not malpractice reforms decrease defensive behaviors
miss the point; from a patient‘s perspective, defensive medicine occurs, and it is the
patient who must endure it.
The debate about defensive medicine has generally centered on whether
malpractice liability reform will decrease health care costs. Most defensivemedicine studies have failed to demonstrate any real evidence on defensive medical
practices arising from higher malpractice premiums. 102 This debate, however,
misses the fact that patients are the ones sustaining the burden of defensive
medicines, tests, procedures, and care. A Patient‘s Compensation Program,
scheduling, and announcing the remedies for medical injury would decrease
defensive medicine behaviors. Defensive medicine, as an attempt to avoid being
sued for malpractice, creates overdeterrence instead of truly curbing subpar care. 103
Another advantage of a Patient‘s Compensation approach would be to
encourage greater integration of physicians into health care organizations as
employees. Traditionally, physicians are licensed, independent practitioners who
are credentialed and privileged by health care facilities but subject to limited
authority.104 Hammer and Sage note the fact that physicians are independent

99. Id. at 15 (averaging the percentage of reductions as to high-risk services and patients across the
studied practice areas: anesthesiology, emergency medicine, family medicine, general surgery, internal
medicine, neurosurgical surgery, obstetrics and gynecology, and orthopedic surgery).
100. See Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Congressional Budget Office, to Sen. Orrin G.
Hatch (Oct. 9, 2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/106xx/doc
10641/10-09-tort_reform.pdf (commenting that tort reform could reduce the practice of defensive
medicine).
101. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Congressional Budget Office, to Sen. John D.
Rockefeller, IV (Dec. 12, 2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/
108xx/doc10802/12-10-medical_malpractice.pdf.
102. See Eisenberg, supra note 30, at 19–21 (describing the ―mixed results‖ found in various studies
performed over the last four decades on how malpractice premiums influence defensive medical
practices); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Defensive Medicine and Tort Reform: New Evidence in an Old
Bottle, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL‘Y & L. 267, 268 (1996) (noting that, despite consensus as to the
existence of defensive medical practices, researchers have been unsuccessful in providing objective
evidence ―to quantify the effects of defensiveness‖).
103. Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence
for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1606 (2001).
104. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 441 (6th ed.
2008).
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practitioners and the formal relationship between physicians and hospitals has been
cast as one in which ―corporate ownership of hospitals‘ physical assets [are] strictly
separated from control over physicians‘ specialized human capital.‖ 105
The advantages of physicians as employees are obvious. If the hospital
employs its physician staff, then the Copperweld doctrine holds that component
parts cannot create a conspiracy.106 Most physicians, however, are not typically
employees nor investor-owners of hospital facilities; they organize as medical staff,
who are generally responsible for quality of care. 107 Because physicians were the
ones purchasing from insurers, and were largely unrestrained in their spending,
hospital medical staff became the true customers. 108 A Patient‘s Compensation
model holds promise for improving physician trust and decreasing resistance by
improving quality of care, and compensating patients without regard to negligence.
There is some empiric data to support this contention; in the Swedish system,
physicians assist their injured patients in the filing of over half of all claims. 109
C. Inefficiency of the Medical Malpractice System
If the medical system has not traditionally done its best for patients, neither
has the legal profession. A low rate of malpractice claims means many injured
patients do not receive compensation. In a Utah/Colorado study of the behavior of
malpractice claiming, ninety-seven percent of patients with negligent medical
injuries did not file claims, with a conversely high rate of claims filed for injuries in
the absence of negligence.110 In The Common Law, Holmes writes that in tort,
individuals should be held morally accountable for their injurious acts.111 Negligent
medical error has likewise been deemed morally blameworthy. 112 For every injury
caused by medical error that does not result in a claim and compensation, arguably
the system has failed to right a moral wrong. 113 The inescapable conclusion is that
105. Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Critical Issues in Hospital Antitrust Law, 22 HEALTH
AFFS. 88, 92 (2003).
106. Id. at 92–93. In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., the Supreme Court eliminated
the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine between corporations and their wholly owned subsidiaries and
held that Copperweld and a wholly owned subsidiary were incapable of conspiring with each other for
purposes of §1 of the Sherman Act. 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984).
107. See Hammer & Sage, supra note 105, at 92.
108. Id.
109. See Studdert & Brennan, supra note 57, at 230.
110. David M. Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and
Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250, 256 (2000).
111. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 79 (1881).
112. EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO, Prevention of Medical Error: Where Professional and
Organizational Ethics Meet 90, in ACCOUNTABILITY: PATIENT SAFETY AND POLICY REFORM (Virginia
Sharpe ed., 2004) (explaining the importance of doctor accountability to victims of medical malpractice
and their loved ones).
113. PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 78 (1993).
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unless an appropriate level of claiming for negligent injuries occur, health care
providers cannot accept the correct level of moral accountability.
The current medical malpractice system is inefficient, as judged by review of
medical records and closed claims review. Three studies formed the basis for the
Institute of Medicine‘s 2000 report To Err is Human.114 The California Medical
Association study in a review of 20,864 medical charts showed that 4.65% of
patients sustained a ―potentially compensable event.‖115 Of these events, only
0.79% were considered as having had legal fault. 116 In other words, only seventeen
percent of patients sustaining medical injury would be eligible for compensation.
The Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS) reviewed 30,121 medical charts and
noted 1,278 injuries (3.7%).117 Of the injuries sustained by patients, 306 (27.6%)
were adjudged due to negligence.118 The HMPS did show that thirty-eight percent
of patients who sustained serious disabilities had negligent adverse events,
compared to twenty percent if injuries were deemed non-negligent.119 Lastly, by
matching a random sample of 31,429 medical charts with statewide data on medical
malpractice claims, the study identified a statewide ratio of negligence to
malpractice claims of 7.6:1.120 A similar medical chart review was carried out in
Utah and Colorado to validate the HMPS and showed the rate of adverse events to
be 2.9% in both states.121 In Utah and Colorado, the rates of negligence
contributing to adverse events were 32.6% and 27.5% respectively.122 The
negligent adverse event to claims ratio was 5.1:1 and 6.7:1 in Utah and Colorado
respectively.123

114. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., supra note 45, at 1. The first
study, the Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS), analyzed injuries sustained by a group of patients
hospitalized in New York and the second study, using the HMPS as a model, analyzed incidents of
adverse events and negligent adverse events in Utah and Colorado. Id.
115. Don Harper Mills, Medical Insurance Feasibility Study—A Technical Summary, 128 W.J. MED.
360, 361–62 (1978) (defining a ―potentially compensable event‖ as a ―disability caused by health care
management‖).
116. Id. at 363.
117. Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized
Patients—Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370, 371 (1991).
118. Id.
119. Lucian L. Leape et al., The Nature of Adverse Events in Hospitalized Patients—Results of the
Harvard Medical Practice Study II, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 377, 380 (1991).
120. A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to
Negligence—Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245, 248
(1991).
121. Eric J. Thomas et al., Incidence and Types of Adverse Events and Negligent Care in Utah and
Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 261, 265 (2000); see also Atul A. Gawande et al., The Incidence and Nature
of Surgical Adverse Events in Colorado and Utah in 1992, 126 SURGERY 66, 71 (1999) (noting that the
incidence of adverse events is the same in surgical and non-surgical care).
122. Thomas et al., supra note 121, at 265.
123. Studdert et al., supra note 110, at 254.
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Closed claims reviews have also been used to study the efficacy of
malpractice claims since studies begun in 1984 by the American Society of
Anesthesiologists.124 The medical specialties of anesthesia, obstetrics, emergency
medicine, family medicine, and surgery have been the richest source of closed
claims data.125 Although relatively small in number, the surgery closed claims data
are instructive; a follow-up to the Utah and Colorado study showed that sixty-six
percent of all adverse events were surgical. 126 Closed claims data analysis has
several advantages over medical chart reviews: physician fears of frank disclosure
leading to sanction or litigation were already addressed; most of the compensated
claims in these reports involve serious to catastrophic injuries; claims files contain
richer information about the medical injury—in addition to the medical record,
evidence, deposition transcripts, interrogatories and answers, claims manager
reviews, and complaints and answers by opposing attorneys. 127
Two groups of researchers have each published a series of recent studies
analyzing surgical closed claims data. One group consisted of members of Harvardaffiliated Departments of Surgery and the School of Public Health. 128 The other
group consisted of the American College of Surgeons‘ (ACS) Committee on
Patient Safety and Professional Liability. 129 The two groups analyzed closed
malpractice claims from different vantage points. The ACS group sought to
determine whether or not injuries were preventable by individual surgeons. 130 The

124. See Frederick W. Cheney, The American Society of Anesthesiologists Closed Claims Project:
The Beginning, 113 ANESTHESIOLOGY 957, 957 (2010); Robert A. Caplan et al., Unexpected Cardiac
Arrest During Spinal Anesthesia: A Closed Claims Analysis of Predisposing Factors, 68
ANESTHESIOLOGY 5, 5 (1988) (noting that the Professional Liability Committee of the American
Society of Anesthesiologists had been conducting closed claim malpractice claims for the previous two
years); John H. Tinker et al., Role of Monitoring Devices in Prevention of Anesthetic Mishaps: A Closed
Claims Analysis, 71 ANESTHESIOLOGY 541, 541–46 (1989); Robert A. Caplan et al., Adverse
Respiratory Events in Anesthesia: A Closed Claims Analysis, 72 ANESTHESIOLOGY 828, 828–33 (1990);
Frederick W. Cheney, The American Society of Anesthesiologists Closed Claims Project: What Have We
Learned, How Has It Affected Practice, and How Will It Affect Practice in the Future?, 91
ANESTHESIOLOGY 552, 552–56 (1999) (discussing the American Society of Anesthesiology‘s Closed
Claims Project findings from 1984 through 1999).
125. Cf. William M. Sage, The Forgotten Third: Liability Insurance And The Medical Malpractice
Crisis, 23 HEALTH AFFS. 10, 13 (2004) (noting that the malpractice insurance crisis harshly affects the
specialties of obstetrics, surgery, radiology, and emergency medicine the most).
126. Gawande et al., supra note 121, at 69.
127. See Griffen & Turnage, supra note 43, at 207.
128. Rogers et al., supra note 46, at 25; Caprice C. Greenberg et al., Patterns of Communication
Breakdowns Resulting in Injury to Surgical Patients, 204 J. AM. COLL. SURGEONS 533, 539–40 (2007);
Scott E. Regenbogen et al., Patterns of Technical Error Among Surgical Malpractice Claims, 246
ANNALS SURGERY 705, 705 (2007).
129. F. Dean Griffen et al., The American College of Surgeons’ Closed Claims Study: New Insights
for Improving Care, 204 J. AM. COLL. SURGEONS 561, 561–62 (2007).
130. Griffen & Turnage, supra note 43, at 206.
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Harvard study examined the role of human and systems factors and errors in
surgical practice.131
The Harvard group reviewed 444 surgery claims—closed between 1986 and
2004 —from four malpractice insurance companies based throughout the United
States.132 The claims covered 21,000 physicians, forty-six acute care hospitals, and
390 outpatient facilities.133 The four most common types of operations that were
the subject of this study included gastrointestinal surgery (twenty-two percent),
spinal surgery (fourteen percent), nonspine orthopedic surgery (ten percent), and
cardiothoracic surgery (nine percent).134 Of the 444 surgical claims studied, 422
involved injuries, and of these injuries, 258 (sixty-one percent) were attributed to
error by reviewers and 164 (thirty-nine percent) were not due to error.135 Errors
were found to occur most often in commonly performed operations by experienced
surgeons where patient complexity or systems failure were present. 136
The ACS study collected data from 460 closed surgical claims at five
malpractice insurance companies.137 Claims were excluded if no indemnity
payment had been made and if the associated loss expense was less than
$25,000.138 Injuries associated with care that fell below accepted standards were
present in fifty percent of claims, and the standard of care was met in thirty-six
percent.139 The incidence of closed claims in which no breach of the standard of
care was identified was remarkably similar between the Harvard and ACS studies
(thirty-nine percent and thirty-six percent, respectively).140
A more recent study of 1,452 closed malpractice claims examined whether
patients had suffered a medical injury and, if so, if the injury was due to medical
error.141 In three percent of the claims, medical injuries were not present, and thirtyseven percent of claims were for error-free injuries.142 Although a low percentage
of errorless claims led to compensation (twenty-eight percent, compared to

131. Id.
132. Rogers et al., supra note 46, at 27.
133. Id. at 26.
134. Id. at 28.
135. Id. at 27.
136. See Regenbogen et al., supra note 128, at 709 tbl.3 (illustrating the frequencies of various
contributing factors to surgical technical error).
137. Griffen et al., supra note 129, at 563.
138. Id. at 562.
139. Id. at 565 tbl.4.
140. Rogers et al., supra note 46, at 27 (providing percentages for the Harvard study); Griffen et al.,
supra note 129, at 565 tbl.4 (providing percentages for the ACS study).
141. David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice
Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED 2024, 2025 (2006).
142. Id. at 2026–28.
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seventy-three percent of claims with errors), error-free injuries accounted for ten
percent of total liability costs in the system. 143
Another measure of the inefficiency of the malpractice system is the timeline
for claims resolution.144 These are long periods for plaintiffs to await decisions
about compensation and for defendants to endure the uncertainty, acrimony, and
time away from patient care that litigation entails. Among the studied claims, the
average time between injury and resolution was five years, and one in three claims
took at least six years to resolve.145
IV. A PATIENT‘S COMPENSATION PROGRAM: PROPOSAL FOR A STATE
DEMONSTRATION PROJECT
Much has been written regarding the implementation of a State
Demonstration Project, advocating an alternative to tort-based reform.146 Little has
been done, despite recommendations to implement state pilot programs for nearly
forty years.147 To date, funds have been awarded sparingly, if at all. 148 The Agency
for Healthcare Research in Quality (AHRQ) has funded a number of demonstration
projects outside of the Affordable Care Act, but none involves a scheduled
approach to remedy for medical injury or other administrative compensation. 149
Any proposal for Patient‘s Compensation insurance should take advantage of the
experience of State programs which have already been enacted—in particular the
Florida and Virginia birth injury compensation programs—to learn what has

143. Id. at 2027–28.
144. See RANDALL R. BOVBJERG & BRIAN RAYMOND, KAISER PERMANENTE INST. FOR HEALTH
POLICY, ISSUE BRIEF: PATIENT SAFETY, JUST COMPENSATION AND MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM 8
(2003) (reporting that, in 2000, the average time to resolve a medical malpractice claim was forty-five
months).
145. Studdert et al., supra note 141, at 2031.
146. The Patient‘s Compensation program I propose has its roots in proposals suggested by a
number of health care law specialists. See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY,
EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 213–17 (1985) (discussing largely the negatives of a no-fault approach);
WEILER ET AL., supra note 113, at 149–52 (1993) (highlighting the advantages of a voluntary program
as an initial step towards a no-fault approach); BAKER, supra note 32, at 163–64 (part of a proposed
Patient Protection and Healthcare Responsibility Act includes a Patient Compensation Program for
injuries not currently compensated, and specifically designed to avoid conflict with common law tort).
147. See DEP‘T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, DHEW PUB. NO. (OS) 73–88, REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY‘S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 102 (1973) (suggesting that states should
implement tort reform projects).
148. See David A. Hyman & William M. Sage, Do Health Reform and Malpractice Reform Fit
Together? 3 (Am. Enter. Inst., Health Policy Working Paper No. 2011-02, 2011) (noting that the
Affordable Care Act‘s provision authorizing demonstration grants to states for alternative tort litigation
dispute has yet to be funded).
149. See Allen Kachalia & Michelle M. Mello, New Directions in Medical Liability Reform, 364
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1564, 1569–70 (2011) (discussing the seven funded demonstration projects and
thirteen year-long planning grants, none of which involve a scheduled approach to remedy for medical
injuries).
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worked and what has not.150 It may be desirable, but not necessary, to enact a
Patient‘s Compensation program in a state which has existing legislation capping
non-economic damages. For instance, Virginia has adopted a total cap on damages
in medical malpractice litigation, and the total amount available under the cap is
similar to that available through the state‘s birth injury program, so there is little to
be gained by avoiding Virginia‘s Birth Injury Compensation Program (BICP)
jurisdiction.151 Virginia‘s eligibility standard is also more permissive in some ways,
making establishing eligibility for compensation easier than under common law tort
action.152 Conversely, claimants in Florida have an incentive to try and circumvent
jurisdiction of the Florida birth injury program and pursue tort remedies for claims
that may have a high probability of success as a negligence action.153 In 2003, caps
on malpractice awards began in Florida; but no systematic study of the effect of the
complex sliding scale formula for non-economic damages currently exists.154
V. A PROPOSAL FOR A PATIENT‘S COMPENSATION PROGRAM
Success in obtaining a grant for Patient‘s Compensation Insurance, or
Patient‘s Compensation Program, would be enhanced by emphasizing three main
elements in the grant, all of which are explicitly set forth in the Affordable Care
Act. First, such a Patient‘s Compensation Program would require input from
stakeholders, including, but not limited to, patients, health care providers,
attorneys, insurers, and those with expertise in patient safety. 155 Second, the
Patient‘s Compensation Insurance grant should attempt to enhance patient safety by
incorporating mechanisms detecting, analyzing, and reducing medical injuries. 156
Third, the proposal should improve access to liability insurance. 157
In addition to the considerations mentioned above, the proposed alternative
should resolve disputes over injuries caused by health care providers or health care
organizations.158 This may be the most important of the elements Congress enacted.
There are three possibilities by which patients can sustain bad outcomes:
150. See Gil Siegal et al., Adjudicating Severe Birth Injury Claims in Florida and Virginia: The
Experience of a Landmark Experiment in Personal Injury Compensation, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 493, 499–
501 (2008) (discussing the Florida and Virginia programs and their operations, viability, and legality as
two primary models for proposals related to birth injury funds).
151. See id. at 495–96.
152. See id. at 500 (listing the distinctions between Florida‘s eligibility standard and Virginia‘s
eligibility standard).
153. See id. at 499–500 (discussing the compensatory damages cap and the restrictive eligibility
criteria for claimants in Florida, which are more restrictive than Virginia‘s birth injury program).
154. Id. at 495.
155. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10607(c), 124 Stat. 119,
1009–10 (2010).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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progression of the patient‘s underlying disease, non-negligent injuries, and
negligent injuries. A Patient‘s Compensation program, to comply with the
Affordable Care Act‘s requirements, must be able to distinguish the first possibility
from the second and third. One approach would be to adapt the worker‘s
compensation formula, in which a patient would recover for any injury more likely
due to treatment received than underlying illness. However, such a comprehensive
definition could make the goal of dispute resolution difficult to accomplish. In
particular, failure of early diagnosis, some infections, and drug side effects could
lead to a dramatic increase in claims for which resolution would be difficult. 159 For
this reason, the Patient‘s Compensation proposal below will focus on a discrete set
of injuries.
A. Scheduling Remedies for Medical Injury
The use of scheduling in cases of medical injury has been proposed for
decades, although initially as a way to constrain the discretion of legal decision
makers in assigning damage awards.160 To be fundamentally fair, similarly situated
parties should be treated similarly; although tort valuations in the aggregate may be
reasonable, awards in individual cases vary greatly. 161 Scheduling of damages for
medical injury, by improving the accuracy and predictability of costs, allows both
the injured and those under whose watch medical injury happens to more precisely
understand the consequences of such injuries. 162 Other types of tort reforms are
generally perceived as a ―zero sum game‖ in which plaintiffs lose while defendants
gain.163
Three alternative types of scheduling reforms were advanced: matrices,
scenarios, and ranges.164 Of the three options, systematizing standard awards by
developing a matrix of dollar value remedies based on type of injury and injury
severity appears the best option; minimizing variability and predictability while
maintaining a degree of flexibility. 165 Setting remedies for medical injury requires
careful consideration of the spectrum of conduct to be covered. To cover all
injuries—physical or otherwise—would extend the range of variation in individual
159. See One Size Does Not Fit All: The Promise of Pharmacogenomics, NAT‘L CENTER
BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO. (Mar. 31, 2004), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/pharm.html (noting
that adverse drug reactions result in 2.2 million serious cases and over 100,000 deaths in the United
States and that pharmaceutical companies are limited to developing ―one size fits all‖ drugs).
160. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling ―Pain and
Suffering,‖ 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 924 (1988) (citation omitted) (discussing scheduling in medical
injury cases and demonstrating that jury awards for individual cases vary according to injury type and
severity).
161. See id. at 923–24.
162. See id. at 975.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 938–39.
165. Id. at 975.
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cases to an unworkable system. There are several approaches to announcing
remedies for medical injury, one includes those euphemistically called Medicare
―never events.‖166 Such events were initially termed Hospital Acquired
Conditions.167 The concept was expanded by the Affordable Care Act to include
Medicaid.168 Further tailoring of the remedy can be made by stratifying the severity
of injury based on one of several standardized scales of severity. Announcing
remedies makes sense in such cases, where the array of claims is narrow, and the
phenomena associated with each claim is precise.169 Scheduling of medical injuries
requires consideration of a number of factors, including a mandate for disclosure,
types of claims to be scheduled, the standard for compensating, what elements
should be included in a compensation package, and the threshold at which injury is
deemed compensable.
1. Mandate for Disclosure
Patients need to know when injuries sustained as a result of medical care have
happened so they can receive compensation. As patient safety initiatives have
grown in importance, so have reporting obligations to state and national entities.
Pennsylvania has a progressive statutory provision in this regard in the ―M-CARE‖
Act 13.170 A number of other states have also enacted patient safety statutes which
166. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 § 5001(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(4) (2011) (directing the
Secretary of HHS to select diagnosis codes for conditions which have a high cost or high volume, or
both; codes which result in the assignment of a case to a diagnosis-related group that has a higher
payment when the code is present as a secondary diagnosis; and codes which describe such conditions
that could reasonably have been prevented through the application of evidence based guidelines).
167. See Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care
Hospitals and the Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System Changes and FY2011 Rates,
75 Fed. Reg. 50042, 50080 (Aug. 16, 2010) (to be codified in scattered parts of 42 C.F.R.). The codes
chosen represent what were termed Hospital Acquired Conditions (HAC) for which higher payments
related to the HAC were prohibited and which were limited in scope to hospitals participating in the
Inpatient Prospective Payment System. Hospital-acquired conditions for which higher payment is
disallowed include foreign objects retained after surgery, air embolism, blood incompatibility, Stage III
and IV pressure ulcers, falls and trauma (fractures, dislocations, intracranial injuries, crushing injuries,
burns, electric shock), manifestations of poor blood sugar control, catheter-associated urinary tract
infection, vascular catheter-associated infection, certain surgical site infections, deep vein thrombosis
and pulmonary embolism. Id. at 50080–85.
168. See Prohibition on Payment for Provider-Preventable Conditions, 42 C.F.R § 447.26 (2011);
Medicaid Program; Payment Adjustment for Provider-Preventable Conditions Including Health CareAcquired Conditions, 76 Fed. Reg. 32816, 32837 (June 6, 2011) (demonstrating that section 2702(a) of
the Affordable Care Act requires that, as of July 1, 2011, the Secretary of HHS must also prohibit
Medicaid payments to States for health care-acquired conditions (HCACs) as defined supra in section
1886(d)(4)(D)(iv)); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2702(a), 124
Stat. 119, 156 (2010).
169. See Bray, supra note 10, at 786–87 (arguing that the legitimate range of variation for some
wrongs, such as all defamation cases, breaches of contract, or intangible injury, is too large).
170. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.308 (West Supp. 2012) (requiring health care workers to
report serious events no later than twenty-four hours after the event).
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also require analysis and reporting of error.171 Resolution of most scheduled
injuries should operationally resemble health or disability insurance, not liability. 172
Several Massachusetts health care organizations received a health planning grant
from the AHRQ to examine the potential for a disclosure, apology, and offer
(DA&O) program.173 Massachusetts, in a recent law also aimed at imposing cost
growth controls on health care entities, also requires health care providers to fully
inform patients about mistakes leading to unanticipated outcomes and medical
complications.174
2. Types of Claims
Scheduling injuries for which claims are allowed is one of the most important
decisions. If the definition of injury is too wide, uncertainty enters regarding
whether a claim fits jurisdiction under the schedule. 175 Defining a narrower subset
of injuries makes claiming predictable, but compensation is limited to a smaller
number of injured.176 An alternative approach is to use a defined list of injuries, all
of which are highly likely to arise as a result of treatment, not an underlying
disease. Medical adversity insurance, a form of no-fault compensation for medical
injuries, was proposed as an alternative to malpractice during the malpractice
insurance crisis of the 1970s.177 Building on the medical adversity insurance
concept, a system of designated compensable events was championed as a form of

171. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1279.3 (West 2007) (mandating that the state‘s
health agency provide the public with information regarding reported adverse events and outcomes of
inspections and investigations of health facilities in the state); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 429.23 (West Supp.
2013) (requiring facilities to establish internal risk management and quality assurance programs and to
report adverse incidents).
172. Randall R. Bovbjerg & Laurence R. Tancredi, Liability Reform Should Make Patients Safer:
―Avoidable Classes of Events‖ Are a Key Improvement, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 478, 489 (2005).
173. See MASS. MED. SOC‘Y, A ROADMAP FOR REMOVING BARRIERS TO DISCLOSURE, APOLOGY
AND OFFER IN MASSACHUSETTS 1 (2012) (citing strong support for the DA&O approach among survey
respondents).
174. S. 2400, 187th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2012) (enacted) (―An Act improving the quality
of health care and reducing costs through increased transparency, efficiency and innovation.‖).
175. MICHELLE M. MELLO & ALLEN KACHALIA, MEDPAC, EVALUATION OF OPTIONS FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE SYSTEM REFORM 30 (2010) (―[L]egal wrangling may arise over whether a particular
claim meets the defined categories for jurisdiction.‖).
176. Id.
177. See Clark C. Havighurst & Laurence R. Tancredi, ―Medical Adversity Insurance‖—A No-Fault
Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 51 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. HEALTH &
SOC'Y 125, 133–34 (1973) (suggesting, as a start, events arising generally from surgical treatment and
post-operative patient management: ―post-operative infections, thrombophlebitis and embolism, catheter
infections, allergic and toxic reactions to antibiotics and other drugs, blood transfusion reactions, foreign
bodies, hospital accidents, adverse consequences during experimental treatment . . . , [and] secondary
injuries from surgery‖).
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limited no-fault by Danzon in her analysis of medical malpractice. 178 Neither
commentator tried to further define such events.
Decades ago, Bovbjerg and Tancredi first suggested the National Quality
Forum‘s (NQF) list of serious reportable events as the basis for ―Avoidable Classes
of Events.‖179 The NQF threshold criteria appear to hold the promise of the best
starting point for a schedule of medical injuries, and balance predictability with
compensation for many injured by health care (Appendix 1). The NQF serious
reportable events have been updated, and require that such events be unambiguous,
largely or entirely preventable, and serious. 180 Twenty-nine events have been
recommended for endorsement as voluntary consensus standards. 181 Additional
specialty-specific and diagnostic injuries (failure to diagnose), including those
caused by independently practicing physicians with admitting privileges to the
hospital, and those caused by diagnostic or treatment decisions made in the
physicians‘ offices could also be added once the original compensation plan is up
and running.182
A second consideration is when to update the scheduled remedies. Two
options are, first, to update at frequent intervals increasing information costs, hence
emphasizing precision over communication. 183 Alternatively, updates could be
infrequent but in larger increments, improving communication at the expense of
precision.184 Lastly, a more theoretical concern is the crowding out of a social
norm, that of preventing medical injury. If the remedies for injury are not set high
enough, health care institutions may view compensation for injuries as a cost of
doing business rather than as an imperative for improving patient safety.
3. Compensation Standard
Defining a schedule of injuries creates a broader standard that does not
require proof of fault or negligence. The NQF‘s list of twenty-nine injuries that
should not happen in a quality health care organization are clear, easily decided,
and encompass most of the unexpected outcomes likely to award patients
compensation. Further, none of these injuries—with the exception of suicide—is
easily accomplished by a patient who might wish to profit by creating an injury.
Lastly, the negative effect on a health care organization that injures patients aligns
178. DANZON, supra note 146, at 217–18.
179. Bovbjerg & Tancredi, supra note 172, at 487.
180. NAT‘L QUALITY FORUM, SERIOUS REPORTABLE EVENTS IN HEALTHCARE—2011 UPDATE: A
CONSENSUS REPORT ii (2011).
181. See Press Release, Nat‘l Quality Forum, NQF Releases Updated Serious Reportable Events
(Jun. 13, 2011), available at http://www.qualityforum.org/News_And_Resources/Press_Releases/2011/
NQF_Releases_Updated_Serious_Reportable_Events.aspx.
182. See WEILER ET AL., supra note 113, at 151.
183. See Bray, supra note 10, at 789.
184. See id. at 790.
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safety principles with compensation; there is an institutional incentive to prevent
such injuries.185
Other alternatives to negligence as a standard are found in foreign systems
that have moved to a ―no-fault‖ form of compensation for medical injury.
Avoidability is the standard applied in Sweden and Denmark; patients are
compensated for injuries that would not have happened if treated by skilled,
experienced specialists.186 In New Zealand, the standard is currently treatment by a
registered health professional causing a physical injury that is not a necessary or
usual outcome of the treatment. 187 Such avoidability or treatment injury standards,
rather than negligence, as the standard for compensation of medical injuries would
likely increase—not decrease—the direct expenditure of resources of a scheduled
compensation Patient‘s Compensation.188 Rightly so: the intent is to compensate
more, not fewer, injured patients, and scheduling injuries may also improve ease of
adjudication.189
4. Financing
From where will the money come? Congress authorized appropriation of
$50,000,000 for the five year period beginning fiscal year 2011 to carry out
authorized State Demonstration Projects.190 Under the Affordable Care Act, each
state desiring a tort reform grant must identify the sources from and methods by
which compensation is paid for claims under the proposed alternative to current tort
litigation, which may include public private funding sources, or a combination of
such sources.191 The Affordable Care Act also requires that money incentives be
provided for patient safety activities to the extent possible.192
The Patient‘s Compensation program should be funded through a
combination of state funds, assessments on physicians and hospitals, and
participation fees. The Florida Birth Injury Compensation Program (Florida
Program) is a good model. In 1988, when the Florida Program was established, the
185. See MELLO & KACHALIA, supra note 175, at 31 (noting that a compensation standard that
provides compensation for a greater number of patients is more in tune with the goal of preventing
overall harm).
186. See MICHELLE M. MELLO ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, ADMINISTRATIVE COMPENSATION
FOR MEDICAL INJURIES: LESSONS FROM THREE FOREIGN SYSTEMS 4 (2011), available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2011/Jul/1517_Mello_ad
min_compensation_med_injuries.pdf.
187. Id.
188. See DANZON, supra note 146, at 215; see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, Medical Malpractice: Its
Cause and Cure 258, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1978).
189. See MELLO & KACHALIA, supra note 175, at 31.
190. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 10607(k), 124 Stat.
119, 1013 (2010).
191. § 10607(c)(3).
192. Id.
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Florida Legislature set aside a one-time appropriation of $20 million. 193 These
funds came from the Insurance Commissioner‘s Regulatory Trust Fund. 194 A
second $20 million installment that could have been transferred was not necessary
to maintain the program on an actuarially sound basis. 195 In addition to these funds,
the Florida Program receives annual assessments from participating and nonparticipating physicians, participating midwives, and hospitals.196 Appropriate
adjustments could be made in the revenues received for services—for example,
direct agreements between a given hospital and attending staff physicians regarding
risky procedures197—or based on physician specialty with certain specialties paying
higher premiums into the Patient‘s Compensation Program. 198
As physicians inexorably become employees, Patient‘s Compensation
Program costs could be a point of negotiation for physician compensation.
Physicians appear to be seeking the stability offered by employment, while
hospitals are looking for more physician-integration with physicians to earn the
incentives offered by the Affordable Care Act, which encourages the use of
integrated health care models such as Accountable Care Organizations, bundled
payments, and medical homes.199
5. Compensation Package
Another question is what should be compensated for the scheduled medical
injuries? The medical liability reform provisions of the Affordable Care Act look
remarkably like a bill that died in committee in 2003, the Reliable Medical Justice
Act.200 The unenacted Reliable Medical Justice Act also described models for

193. OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY, FLA. LEGISLATURE, REP.
NO. 04-04, NICA ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS COULD BE EXPANDED, BUT THE COSTS WOULD
INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY 3 (2004), available at http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/reports/pdf/0404rpt.pdf.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See id. at 4. The Florida Program is funded by hospitals and participating and non-participating
health care providers are assessed as entity participants. Id. Physicians pay $5,000, midwives pay
$2,500, non-participating physicians pay $250, and hospitals pay $50 per live birth. Id.
197. See WEILER ET AL., supra note 113, at 151.
198. See Anupam B. Jena et al., Malpractice Risk According to Physician Specialty, 356 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 629, 632 (2011) (reporting that physicians‘ claims varied each year across specialties:
neurosurgery (19.1%), thoracic–cardiovascular surgery (18.9%), general surgery (15.3%), family
medicine (5.2%), pediatrics (3.1%), and psychiatry (2.6%)).
199. See MERRITT HAWKINS, 2011 REVIEW OF PHYSICIAN RECRUITING INCENTIVES 4 (2011),
available at http://www.merritthawkins.com/pdf/mha2011incentivesurvPDF.pdf.
200. Compare Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10607(c)(2), 124
Stat. 119, 1009 (2010) (―(A) makes the medical liability system more reliable by increasing the
availability of prompt and fair resolution of disputes; (B) encourages the efficient resolution of dispute;
(C) encourages the disclosure of health care errors; (D) enhances patient safety by detecting, analyzing,
and helping to reduce medical errors and adverse events; (E) improves access to liability insurance; (F)
fully informs patients about the differences in the alternative and current tort litigation; (G) provides
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alternative liability regimes in some detail. 201 The Reliable Medical Justice Act
defined ―Net Economic Loss,‖ elements of which a Patient‘s Compensation
program could encompass as a compensation package for patients who sustain a
medical injury.202 Net economic loss, as defined in the Reliable Medical Justice
Act, includes four components:
(A) reasonable expenses . . . needed for health care . . . and other
remedial care of an injured individual; (B) . . . expenses for
rehabilitation treatment and occupational training; (C) 100 percent of
the loss of income from work that an injured individual would have
performed if not injured . . . ; and (D) reasonable expenses incurred
in obtaining ordinary and necessary services to replace services an
injured individual would have performed for the benefit of the
individual or the family of such individual if the individual had not
been injured.203
A similar approach has been used by the Virginia Birth Injury Compensation
Program.204 The Virginia program identifies three broad categories of benefits.
First, reasonably necessary medical expenses, costs of rehabilitation and custodial
care, and any special facilities or equipment exclusive of reimbursement by other
government social programs or private insurers. 205 Second, there is a calculation for
lost earnings from ages eighteen to sixty-five.206 Lastly, there is an allowance
resulting from filing the claim and attorney fees. 207 An alternate proposal was put
forth in a proposal by Weiler and colleagues suggesting legislation to require
payment for self-paid medical expenses, a percentage of net lost earnings up to
twice that of the state‘s average wages, and non-pecuniary damage for certain
physical disabilities.208

patients the ability to opt out of or voluntarily withdraw from participating in the alternative at any time
and to pursue other options, including litigation, outside the alternative; (H) would not conflict with
State law at the time of the application in a way that would prohibit the adoption of an alternative to
current tort litigation; and (I) would not limit or curtail a patient‘s existing legal rights, ability to file a
claim in or access a State‘s legal system, or otherwise abrogate a patient‘s ability to file a medical
malpractice claim.‖), with Reliable Medical Justice Act, S. 1518, 108th Cong. § 3990(c)(2) (1st Sess.
2003) (proposing an alternative to the current malpractice regime that ―(A) makes the medical liability
system more reliable; (B) enhances patient safely; and (C) maintains access to liability insurance‖).
201. S. 1518 § 3990(d) (describing the Early Disclosure and Compensation Model, the
Administrative Determination of Compensation Model, and the Special Health Care Court Model).
202. S. 1518 § 3990(j)(4).
203. Id.
204. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5009 (Supp. 2012) (establishing the factors and conditions that
affect granting of commission awards for birth related injuries).
205. Id.; see also JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT & REVIEW COMM‘N, VA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, supra note
60, at ii–iii.
206. JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT & REVIEW COMM‘N, VA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, supra note 60, at iii.
207. Id.
208. WEILER ET AL., supra note 113, at 151.
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6. Establishing an Injury Threshold
The health care acquired conditions should be further stratified by severity of
injury so appropriate thresholds for compensation can be set. 209 Such thresholds
ensure that compensation is given to those who are more severely injured. 210 There
is experience with establishing thresholds. New Zealand provides payment for only
for permanent injuries of body parts or loss of function. 211 Sweden and Denmark
compensate non-disabling pain and disfigurement. 212 One useful classification
system is that of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). 213
Another detailed classification system is that promulgated by the National
Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention (NCC
MERP).214 The Patient‘s Compensation schedule could compensate medical
injuries at or above a given NCC MERP category sustained by patients, including
those caused by independently practicing physicians with admitting privileges to
the hospital, and those caused by diagnostic or treatment decisions made in the
physicians‘ offices.
Both the NAIC and NCC MERP injury scales allow for the separation of
injuries into lesser and greater degrees, from errors that do not reach the patient—
‖near misses‖—to death.215 Creating a modest threshold would direct limited
209. See MELLO & KACHALIA, supra note 175, at 30 (finding a ―potential benefit‖ of stratifying
health care acquired conditions because it would create a ―more predictable set of claims to adjudicate‖).
210. Studdert & Brennan, supra note 57, at 232.
211. See MELLO ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, supra note 186, at 7.
212. See id.
213. M. Patricia Sowka, The Medical Malpractice Closed Claims Study: Executive Summary 45
CONN. MED. 91, 93 tbl.5 (1981) (detailing a nine-point classification system created by NAIC). The
nine-point scale includes the following categories (examples): (1) Emotional only (fright, no physical
damage); (2) Temporary insignificant (lacerations, contusions, minor scars, rash; no recovery delay); (3)
Temporary minor (infections, fracture, fall in hospital; recovery delayed); (4) Temporary major (burns,
surgical material left, drug side effect, brain damage; recovery delayed); (5) Permanent minor (loss of
fingers, loss or damage to organs; includes non-disabling injuries); (6) Permanent significant (deafness,
loss of limb, loss of eye, loss of one kidney or lung); (7) Permanent major (paraplegia, blindness, loss of
two limbs, brain damage); (8) Permanent grave (quadriplegia, severe brain damage, lifelong care or fatal
prognosis); (9) Death. Id.
214. See NAT‘L COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR MEDICATION ERROR REPORTING & PREVENTION,
THE COUNCIL: MOVING INTO THE SECOND DECADE 48 fig.1 (2010) (illustrating the NCC MERP Index
for Categorizing Medication Errors). The NCC MERP Index separates medication errors into nine
categories: (1) Circumstances or events that have the capacity to cause error; (2) An error occurred but
the error did not reach the patient; (3) An error occurred that reached the patient but did not cause
patient harm; (4) An error occurred that reached the patient and required monitoring to confirm that it
resulted in no harm to the patient and/or required intervention to preclude harm; (5) An error occurred
that may have contributed to or resulted in temporary harm to the patient and required intervention; (6)
An error occurred that may have contributed to or resulted in temporary harm to the patient and required
initial or prolonged hospitalization; (7) An error occurred that may have contributed to or resulted in
permanent patient harm; (8) An error occurred that required intervention necessary to sustain life; (9) An
error occurred that may have contributed to or resulted in the patient‘s death. Id.
215. Id.
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resources towards compensation for the injured while expanding coverage beyond
those whose serious or catastrophic injuries would allow them to pursue a
malpractice lawsuit.216 At the same time, a threshold would prevent the
administrative costs of adjudicating a large number of claims for minor temporary
or insignificant injuries.217
B. Announcing Remedies for Patients Suffering Medical Injury
1. Announcing Remedies as an Alternative to Medical Malpractice
Samuel Bray has observed that for most violations of legal rules, remedies are
tailored to fit a specific wrong. 218 Announcing remedies for injuries sustained as a
result of medical care holds promise of three important patient benefits. First, there
is greater equality: an injured patient‘s right to compensation is not constrained by
what a plaintiff‘s attorney would consider to be a ―valuable‖ case or other factors
such as race or socioeconomic status. 219 Second, announcing remedies for medical
injury produces greater compliance with rules designed to enhance patient safety,
as well as helps to control positive and negative defensive medicine behaviors. 220
Lastly, announcing such remedies eliminates the costs of recovery from injury, or
hedonic adaptation.221 Telling a successful story in a medical malpractice setting

216. Studdert & Brennan, supra note 57, at 232.
217. David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Toward A Workable Model Of ―No-Fault‖
Compensation For Medical Injury In The United States, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 230 (2001) (finding
that a medical injury system without a disability threshold wastes significant administrative resources on
a large number of claims for relatively minor incidents).
218. Bray, supra note 10, at 754.
219. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
857, 886 (1999) (arguing that incorporating a prophylactic remedy into a right may be more efficient;
Levinson‘s taxonomy would consider announcing remedies for medical injury as remedial
incorporation).
220. See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments,
90 AM. ECON. REV. 980, 993 (2000) (concluding that cooperators in social dilemma situations will
punish ―free riders‖ even if there are no material benefits for punishers); Robert Boyd et al.,
Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare, 328
SCIENCE 617, 619 (2010) (documenting that costs of punishing free-riders decreases as the number of
punishers increases). But see Helen Bernhard et al., Parochial Altruism in Humans, 442 NATURE 912,
913 (2006) (showing that punishment is more likely if the victim and punisher are from the same social
―ingroup,‖ but less likely if they are from different social groups).
221. See Stan V. Smith, Measuring the Loss of Enjoyment in Personal Injury Cases in Washington –
Hedonic Damages, TRIAL NEWS, Jan. 1997, at 29, 29–30 (commenting that defense testimony on
hedonic damages can prevent runaway damage awards). But see Ayers v. Robinson, 887 F. Supp 1049,
1064 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding in that case that Stan V. Smith‘s testimony on the issue of hedonic
damages was inadmissible); Brendan I. Koerner, What’s Your Happiness Worth?, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Jan.–
Feb. 2004, at 54 (noting that expert testimony on the issue of hedonic damages is often considered
inadmissible, but when admitted leads jurors ―to dole out millions‖).
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impairs hedonic adaptation, an important process for letting patients recover and
move on.222
These three benefits of announcing remedies for medical injury—equality for
the injured, compliance by providers, and costs of telling—are achieved through
one of several functions as articulated by Bray. 223 A first function is that of
reducing information costs by announcing remedies for medical injury. 224 Overhead
costs have been estimated at between forty and fifty-four percent of the total cost of
litigation.225 By announcing a remedy for an entire class of injuries, a decision on
remedy only needs to be made once.226 Patients, often unsophisticated in medical
knowledge, may underestimate the injury sustained, while health care providers—
sophisticated repeat players—know an injury to be caused by the provision of
health care.227 Announcing a schedule of injuries for which remedy exists would
level the playing field with respect to medical injury.
Second, announcing remedies has a precommitment function that reduces
information costs for sophisticated repeat players, the health care providers. 228 By
knowing the cost of a given medical injury, providers can not only forecast total
costs of care, but also generate priorities for further injury reduction strategies. 229
External costs of a given health care encounter can be defined as changes in
consumption less changes in production. 230 The trend towards evidence-based
medicine in assisting with the definition of socially optimal behavior has many
proponents, but forging consensus on even basic medical treatments can be
difficult.231 Health care should be controlled by pricing if external costs are easier
to assess, and if it is easier to identify socially optimal behavior, then sanctions
should be imposed for non-optimal behavior.232 And yet, precommitment to a

222. Bray, supra note 10, at 755–56; Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 11, at 785.
223. Bray, supra note 10, at 764–74.
224. Id. at 780.
225. Compare MELLO & KACHALIA, supra note 175, at 34 (citing overhead costs to be forty
percent), with Studdert et al., supra note 141, at 2031 (citing overhead costs to be over fifty percent).
226. Bray, supra note 10, at 774.
227. See id. at 785–86 (explaining that announcing serves as communication, which allows for the
remedy to be publicized, and therefore, the public is less likely to underestimate it).
228. See id. at 780.
229. See id. at 778 (explaining that announcing remedies ensures that the gap between the cost and
its perception would decrease).
230. Magnus Johannesson, The Willingness To Pay For Health Changes, The Human-Capital
Approach And The External Costs, 36 HEALTH POL‘Y 231, 232 (1996).
231. See Ronen Avraham, Clinical Practice Guidelines: the Warped Incentives in the U.S.
Healthcare System, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 16 (2011) (noting that medical guidelines have led to an
increase in the practice of evidence-based medicine and explaining that variation of medical practices
across geographic areas, has led to a lack of consensus on medical treatments).
232. Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1533 (1984).
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schedule of remedies for medical injury takes the ―yoke of liability‖ 233 off the vast
majority of physicians who otherwise would be tempted to engage in poorlyinformed attempts at positive or negative defensive behaviors, and who rarely
intend injury to their patients. 234
Cost-saving is a third function. Cost-saving as the term is used here does not
refer to all costs of remedies for medical injury. In fact, total costs of such a
program have been predicted to increase with the increase in paid claims for
medical injury.235 Instead, the savings are in administrative costs, which in the
medical malpractice litigation regime—win or lose—are high.236 In case-by-case
remedies, such as those sought in malpractice suits, negligence must be proved
under a preponderance of evidence standard, and courts must decide a remedy in
each case.237 Announcing a remedy ex ante for a class of injuries would reduce
administrative costs.238
Overhead associated with malpractice claims is a major source of costs that
do not directly benefit injured patients. One Harvard study of medical malpractice
observed that the overhead costs of malpractice litigation are exorbitant, with the
average costs of defending claims going to trial nearly three times the cost for
claims resolved out of court.239 Defense costs and standard plaintiffs‘ attorneys‘
contingency fees, other expenses notwithstanding, brought the total costs of
litigation to fifty four percent of that paid out to plaintiffs. 240
Claims involving harmful errors were responsible for eighty percent of
overhead expenses.241 The data are remarkably consistent over time. A 1976 study
estimated that the malpractice system returned at the most only twenty-eight cents
of the malpractice premium dollar to injured patients; only 12.5 cents reimbursed
the patient for losses not otherwise compensated.242 Analysis of over 26,000
malpractice claims closed in the decade ending in 2005 showed a mean defense

233. Richard N. Waldman, Together We Can Do Something Wonderful, 115 OBSTETRICS AND
GYNECOLOGY 1116, 1118 (2010).
234. See Cooter, supra note 232, at 1537–38 (―Sanctions increase with the need for deterrence, as
indicated by the actor‘s state of mind, whereas prices increase with the amount of external harm caused
by the act, which is invariant with respect to the actor's state of mind.‖).
235. DANZON, supra note 146, at 217–18 (explaining that the downside in implementing a ―no-fault
plan‖ is that it provides automatic compensation when there is a ―strong presumption of negligence).
236. See MELLO ET AL., supra note 59, at 3.
237. See, e.g., Todd v. United States, 570 F. Supp. 670, 677 (D.S.C. 1983) (noting that the burden of
proof in a medical malpractice case requires a plaintiff to establish the defendant‘s liability through a
preponderance of the evidence).
238. See supra notes 221–24 and accompanying text.
239. Studdert et al., supra note 141, at 2026–27, 2031.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Jeffrey O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurance
for Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 501, 509 (1976).
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cost of about $23,000, with non-paid claims payment still at an average cost of
about $17,000.243
The Affordable Care Act has made health care insurance a statutory
responsibility for all and not a luxury for a select few. 244 Cost sharing for all
covered individuals is capped, so out of pocket expenses—whether for underlying
disease or as a result of medical injury—are limited.245 Further, there is no good
way for such a system to provide prevention of similar future injuries. 246Although
patient costs for direct care are limited to $5,000, there are still costs borne by the
injured and their families in terms of lost wages while healing from such injuries. 247
In the past, physicians and hospitals could bill for additional services incurred when
patients suffered medical injuries. 248 CMS has promulgated guidelines proscribing
payment for ―never events,‖ citing the cost to Medicare. 249 With the inability of
health care providers to be paid for care necessary for the treatment of certain
injuries, and yet liable for medical injuries under common law torts, health care
organizations currently pay twice for injuries, once by absorbing the cost of carerelated injuries, and again by indemnification against liability claims.
2. Uniting Patient Safety Enhancements and Compensation
a. Experience Rating of Physicians and Health Care Organizations
One concern of eliminating the requirement of negligence is a moral
imbalance, that health care providers will develop a cavalier attitude towards
patient safety if negligence no longer serves as a means for holding doctors
responsible for mistakes.250 This concern can be overcome by implementing
experience rating for health care provider contributions and a strong reporting
mechanism. The Patient‘s Compensation program should require contributions to

243. Seth Seabury et al., Letter to the Editor, Defense Costs of Medical Malpractice Claims, 366
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354, 1355 (2012).
244. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); see also
Focus on Health Reform: Summary of New Health Reform Law, KAISER FAM. FOUND., 1 (Apr. 15,
2011), http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8061.pdf.
245. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1302(c)(1)(A).
246. See Kachalia & Mello, supra note 149, at 1565 (noting that evidence suggests that the medical
malpractice liability system does not adequately incentivize physicians from engaging in negligent care).
247. 26 U.S.C. § 223(c)(2)(A)(ii) (2011) (stating that current dollar values for coverage are $5,000
for individual coverage, and twice that amount for family coverage, leaving all other costs for the
injured parties to bear).
248. See Barry R. Furrow, Regulating Patient Safety: The Patient Protection And Affordable Care
Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1727, 1752 (2011).
249. Id. at 1753.
250. See BAKER, supra note 32, at 113–14 (discussing how tort lawsuits seek to correct the moral
imbalance between a patient living with the consequences of a medical mistake and the doctor
potentially responsible for that mistake).
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the compensation funds for individual physicians and health care organizations to
be ―experience-rated,‖ where health care providers (individual or organizational)
with higher than average numbers of announced injuries have higher contributions.
Experience rating would likely be complex; adjustments could be made for
certain injuries or levels of payouts. 251 A physician‘s specialty, age, and years
remaining in practice could also be factors to consider. 252 Such ―experience rating‖
is designed to maintain provider responsibility and is an incentive to minimize
medical injuries. Further, announcing the costs for each class of compensable
events permits allocation of specific risks in such a way as to focus attention on
particular quality questions (for example, hospital acquired infections).
b. Medical Reviews of Physicians and Hospitals Should Be Rigorous
Institutions, rather than individual physicians or providers groups, should be
the participants, as they have the best means of announcing remedies for medical
injury and linking the compensation program to patient safety incentives. 253 The
health care facilities‘ quality assurance program should include internal oversight
measures for assessing accountability for medical injuries identified through the
Patient‘s Compensation claims process. Immunity from antitrust liability should be
extended to cover the physician-members of hospital peer review committees
responsible for alteration of the practice privileges of ―repeat offender‖
physicians.254 Criteria for deciding upon sanctions and censure should be clear and
unambiguous; perhaps a point system similar to that used for vehicle licensing
could be considered.
External oversight should also be included in Patient‘s Compensation
legislation, which should direct the State‘s Board of Medicine (BOM) and
Department of Health (DOH) to register and review all submitted medical injury
claims.255 The Board of Medicine should be required to assess whether the
physician(s) involved in the injury claim provided substandard care that would
warrant disciplinary action by the BOM. The DOH would selectively review claims
to determine whether the hospital and its staff provided inadequate medical care
that should impact the hospital‘s license. The State could mandate, by statute, that
its BOM and DOH develop a plan for ensuring that all injury claims are submitted
to the State‘s BOM and DOH for review. Further, the BOM and DOH could

251. Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 177, at 129–30.
252. Id. at 130.
253. Studdert & Brennan, supra note 57, at 231.
254. 42 U.S.C. § 11111–112(a) (2011) (stating that certain bodies or persons who participate in a
professional review action found to be ―in the furtherance of quality health care,‖ among other factors,
should not be liable to pay damages for such action).
255. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5004 (2007) (outlining the state of Virginia's review process
for investigating birth-related medical injuries).
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conduct selective investigations of the claimant and other relevant parties of the
events surrounding the claims injury and to notify claimants concerning the
outcome of the review.
3. Filing Method and Adjudication
Announcing the remedy for medical injury means that the Patient‘s
Compensation program claims process would be navigable without attorneys.
Representation for injured patients would not be barred, and attorneys could still
represent the injured for a reasonable, but likely not contingent, fee. 256 Access to
legal counsel would provide protection regarding eligibility and payment. 257 At the
time patients are notified of their injury, they should be encouraged to file a claim
for compensation. Claims should be received at a central organization, preferably at
the state level.258 This central organization would have responsibility for receipt of
claims, adjudication, and dispensing compensation. 259
Initial adjudication would fall to an administrative claims manager with a
background in law or health care, preferably both. 260 Claims administrators should
have access to experts appointed by the Patient‘s Compensation program, and not
the parties.261 Claims administrators and neutral experts would not necessarily need
to be grounded in evidence-based medicine. The list of compensable medical
injuries as announced would require little additional knowledge. A database of all
claims, kept by the State‘s department of health or medical licensure would insure
that precedent would be documented, improving the accuracy of the claims
administrators‘ adjudication. The New Zealand and Swedish administrative models
both rely on such administrators.262
The claims administration procedure should meet acceptable standards of
accessibility, neutrality, and due process. Florida uses two independent experts in

256. See MELLO & KACHALIA, supra note 175, at 30–31 (noting that the need for an attorney may
depend on the filing method‘s complexity and that removing the need for an attorney would potentially
make filing easier).
257. Bovbjerg & Tancredi, supra note 172, at 490.
258. Studdert & Brennan, supra note 57, at 230.
259. Id.
260. See MELLO & KACHALIA, supra note 175, at 31 (discussing the possible adjudicators in an
administrative model including administrative claims managers with or without a background in law or
health care among others).
261. See id. at 31–32 (noting how some medical court models propose that an adjudicator, acting as
a ―physician-judge,‖ receive assistance from neutral experts in an effort to produce more accurate
decisions).
262. See Kachalia et al., supra note 58, at 390–91 (elaborating on how the Swedish and New
Zealand models both employ claims handlers with clinical or legal backgrounds or with specialties in
certain types of claims); see also Mello et al., supra note 211, at 6 (noting how New Zealand uses claims
adjusters with clinical backgrounds).
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the review of birth injury claims, while Virginia uses three.263 One argument in
favor of Virginia‘s consensus-decision approach revolves around the complexities
of the decisions. Deliberations and debate among a group of experts, each of whom
contributes his or her own perspective and expertise, would appear to be a useful
way to address complex clinical issues. Unlike the Patient‘s Compensation
approach, in which a defined set of injuries and severity are clear cut, the use of a
panel is also advantageous in ensuring transfer of knowledge and consistency of
decision making when individual experts transfer out of and into the program.
Overall, one claims administrator should be able to adjudicate most, if not all,
claims.
4. Informed Consent for Patients Admitted to Hospitals
The Affordable Care Act requires participating states to notify patients if they
are eligible for the Patient‘s Compensation Program (or other tort alternative) and
the method by which they may decline to participate or withdraw from the
program.264 The Patient‘s Compensation Program should inform, ex ante, all
patients about the program, as well as those who are injured ex post.265 Patients
would have to be fully informed, in easily comprehensible terms of both the tort
rights they were surrendering and the no-fault benefits they would be eligible to
receive, before they were asked to decide either to accept medical care under nofault auspices or to use institutions and doctors still governed by the existing tort
regime.
To encourage announcing, participating physicians and health care
organizations should be mandated by legislation to obtain informed consent
regarding program participation from all patients under their care. 266 The Virginia
Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Program has used brochures to
explain a patient‘s rights and limitations under the program, especially the
exclusive remedy provisions.267 Participating physicians and hospitals that fail to
obtain informed consent of patients could be made subject to sanctions, such as
remedial work plans, monetary penalties, or, in the case of recalcitrant physicians,
suspension of privileges for a period of time.

263. See Siegal et al., supra note 150, at 522–23.
264. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10607(c), 124 Stat. 119,
1009–10 (2010).
265. See JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT & REVIEW COMM‘N, VA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, supra note 60, at vii,
x. JLARC found that although the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Program
supplied patient brochures to physician and health care for distribution, most of the claimant families
indicated that the most common source of information about the program was an attorney. Id. at x.
266. Id. at x.
267. Id.
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C. Eliminating the Collateral Source Rule and Other Insurance Considerations
The Affordable Care Act, by making health care a responsibility—not a
right—has made application of the collateral source rule (the Rule) more
complex.268 Institution of a Patient‘s Compensation program would further weaken
the rationale for applying the Rule in determination of damages and may render it
unnecessary. In general terms, the Rule prohibits reducing a claimant‘s medical
expense damages by the amount of health insurance coverage. 269 The intent is to
prevent the fact-finder, usually a jury, from considering whether the claimant has
health insurance in determining fault of the defendant. 270 With the constitutionality
of the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act affirmed, fact-finders may
now assume that claimants have health insurance. 271 Continued application of the
Rule, therefore, protects only those individuals choosing to willfully forgo health
insurance, and rewards such willfully uninsured claimants with full damages
despite the decision to forgo coverage. 272
Implementation of a Patient‘s Compensation program would require that the
health care providers cover the medical costs of a health care-related injury.
Regardless of insurance status, insurers and their insured customers would not bear
the costs of paying for such injuries. Further, the scheduled injuries which are
announced prior to injury are not expected to occur to anyone, insured or not.
Neither would subrogation decrease the remedy to the injured, as these costs are
not paid by insurers, who are not entitled to any recovery. 273
Health insurers should be involved in setting up a Patient‘s Compensation
program for two reasons. First, with recent exceptions, insurers currently pay for
many of the costs associated with medical injury. If insurers can be persuaded that
a Patient‘s Compensation approach would lead to improved patient safety through
prevention of medical injury, they could be strong advocates for change. 274

268. See generally Rebecca Levenson, Allocating the Costs of Harm to Whom They are Due:
Modifying the Collateral Source Rule After Health Care Reform, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 922–23
(2012).
269. Matsyuk v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 229 P.3d 893, 899 n.8 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (citing
Mahler v. Szucs, 957 P.2d 632, 655 n.4 (Wash. 1998)) (―The collateral source rule is the ‗well settled
rule in tort actions that a party has a cause of action notwithstanding the payment of his loss by an
insurance company.‘‖). See generally James L. Branton, The Collateral Source Rule, 18 ST. MARY‘S
L.J. 883, 883 (1987).
270. See Levenson, supra note 268, at 924–25.
271. Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012).
272. See Levenson, supra note 268, at 936.
273. Id. at 942–47 (defining subrogation as ―a contractual arrangement through which a claimant‘s
primary insurer is reimbursed for its coverage of the claimant‘s medical costs if the claimant recovers
these costs from a tortfeasor‖).
274. See Studdert & Brennan, supra note 57, at 252.
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Second, health insurers should be consulted as any award to the injured
patient might otherwise be considered subject to subrogation. 275 By compensating
injured patients according to an announced, scheduled program of injuries, there is
no tortfeasor, so insurers could attempt to recover against the insured. 276 Health
insurance plans‘ benefits will still cover some of the patient‘s health care related
expenses for the interval in which patients are injured. Patient‘s Compensation
awards should not be reduced to reflect payments from collateral sources as
collateral sources should still compensate injury-unrelated medical costs.277 The
cost to the Patient‘s Compensation program of the total cost of remedying covered
medical injuries would be off-set by decreasing administrative costs (e.g., less court
time, lower legal expenses), and ending lengthy discovery about defendants‘
negligence, no-fault should provide faster, more efficient compensation. 278 A
Patient‘s Compensation approach would take on the burden of an amount
approaching the total cost of the injuries which occur, and health insurers seeking
subrogation may have those claims deflected by the requirements that the injured
first be made whole.279
D. Other Administrative Requirements of the Affordable Care Act
A Patient‘s Compensation proposal would also have to account for a number
of provisions of the Affordable Care Act. Some are expected of all grantees; such
as an application 280 and submission of an annual report to HHS, evaluating the
effectiveness of funded activities and including the impact of the activities funded
on patient safety.281 The specific elements of the proposal would likely be the same
as elements upon which the HHS Secretary is required to report.282 A Patient‘s

275. See Studdert & Brennan, supra note 57, at 254. Therefore, any damages awarded to a plaintiff
who has already received payment from the insurance company would otherwise, under subrogation, be
used to reimburse the damages paid by the insurance company.
276. See id. at 247 (listing four possible subrogation arguments: 1) attempts to recover payments
from the paid compensation to the insured; 2) in the case of an insured attempting to recover medical
payments an imposed formal agreement subrogating the insurer to proceeds of any recovery; 3) an
attempt to deflect strict liability on the grounds that an insured has received monies from the Patient‘s
Compensation program; and 4) that with no tortfeasor other subrogation rights may be prejudiced).
277. See Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 177, at 129–30 (discussing the concerns surrounding
collateral sources of compensation for ancillary damages, such as lost wages, and their impact on
damages).
278. See Studdert & Brennan, supra note 57, at 229 (discussing the advantages of a no-fault
compensation scheme, in terms of cost reduction).
279. See id. at 246–47 (discussing issues relating to health insurers seeking subrogation for matters
beyond compensating the injured patient first).
280. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10607(d)(1), 124 Stat. 119,
1010–11 (2010).
281. § 10607(e)(1).
282. § 10607(g)(3)(A)–(H). The elements required by Congress include: ―A) the nature and number
of disputes over injuries allegedly caused by health care providers or health care organizations; B) the
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Compensation program proposal will have to demonstrate how the proposed
alternative increases the availability of prompt, fair, efficient resolution of
disputes.283 The program will also have to enhance patient safety by encouraging
the disclosure and reduction of medical errors and adverse effects. 284 Further, the
grant must provide a mechanism for the fully informed consent of patients
regarding the differences in the alternative and current tort litigation. 285
There are additional requirements. The Patient‘s Compensation Program must
provide patients the ability to opt out of or voluntarily withdraw from participating
in the alternative at any time and to pursue other options, including litigation. 286
The Affordable Care Act is careful to make explicit the requirement that any
Compensation Project must allow participants to withdraw at any time. 287 One
foreseeable problem with the Affordable Care Act‘s State Demonstration Project
provisions as currently worded is the possibility that an injured patient could file a
malpractice claim after settling with the Patient‘s Compensation program. 288 It is
likely the intent of Congress in enacting the Affordable Care Act with regard to a
patient‘s ability to take advantage of both torts and the alternative would have to be
decided by the courts. Other requirements require additional consideration.
1. Scope of Jurisdiction
A Patient‘s Compensation grant will have to determine a scope of jurisdiction
sufficient to evaluate the effects of the tort alternative. 289 As noted earlier, the scope
of jurisdiction could be a state, a more limited geographical area, or even a specific
group of health care providers, but could not be a single payer or single patient
population.290

nature and number of claims in which tort litigation was pursued despite the existence of an alternative;
C) the disposition of disputes and claims, including the length of time and estimated costs to all parties;
D) the medical liability environment; E) health care quality; F) patient safety in terms of detecting,
analyzing, and helping to reduce medical errors and adverse events; G) patient and health care provider
and organization satisfaction with the alternative and with the medical liability environment; and the H)
impact on utilization of medical services, appropriately adjusted for risk.‖ Id.
283. § 10607(c)(2)(A)–(B).
284. § 10607(c)(2)(C)–(D).
285. § 10607(c)(2)(F).
286. § 10607(c)(4)(B).
287. Id.
288. § 10607(c)(2)(I) (stating that no limits would be placed on a patient‘s existing legal rights for
purposes of a malpractice claim).
289. § 10607(c)(4)(A).
290. Id. See also supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
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2. Preference in Awarding Demonstration Grants
Chances for successful funding of a Patient‘s Demonstration proposal will be
enhanced by noting that the Secretary is required to give preference to proposals
developed in consultation with relevant stakeholders.291One good example of
―substantive consultation with relevant stakeholders‖ is the survey of leaders in
medical care and health law detailed in a recent roadmap for a disclosure, apology,
and early offer program developed in Massachusetts. 292 Interviewees included
members of the Massachusetts legislature, hospital systems (academic and
community hospitals), practicing physicians, liability insurers, health insurers,
medical professional associations, patient advocacy organizations, malpractice
attorneys, patient safety experts, major physician practice groups, and a major
business association (otherwise unnamed).293
The proposal should also enhance ―patient safety by detecting, analyzing, and
helping to reduce medical errors and adverse events.‖ 294 Here, the Patient‘s
Compensation proposal, by virtue of the documentation of claims submissions and
outcomes will do exactly that. Lastly, The Secretary is to give preference to
proposals that are likely to ―improve access to liability insurance.‖ 295 For the
schedule of announced remedies as proposed in this liability alternative, access to
liability insurance is unlikely to be significantly changed. Any claim falling outside
of the NQF criteria (Appendix 1) will still, initially, require litigation. Long-term,
however, if successful, the schedule of injuries may be made more inclusive
leading to a preference away from litigation, at which point decreased litigation
may lead to less expensive—hence more accessible—malpractice insurance.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Patient‘s Compensation insurance, or scheduling and announcing remedies
for medical injury, is a novel option to current medical malpractice litigation. The
proper framework for understanding the rationale of a no-fault based approach to
medical injuries is to compensate a higher proportion of patients by eliminating the
need to prove negligence. Systems research has shown that few injuries are due
solely to the acts of one individual, often making negligence hard to prove. Further,
the cost of litigating on a contingent basis severely limits the number of injured
patients eligible for compensation. The Affordable Care Act has provided a
template for the development of state-based demonstration projects. There is
experience both domestically and abroad for how to structure such a program.

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

§ 10607(c)(5).
See MASS. MED. SOC‘Y, supra note 173, at 3–4.
Id. at 3, 22 tbl.2.
§ 10607(c)(2)(D).
§ 10607(c)(5)(C).
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A number of the cases that would likely be brought to the Compensation
Project are those with a potential payment of less than $200,000—suggested as a
cut-off value below which plaintiffs‘ attorneys will rarely take a malpractice
case.296 Therefore, the lower value injuries are unlikely to be pursued by plaintiffs‘
attorneys. In tort, the requirement for serious or catastrophic injury limits the
number of patients who can hope to receive compensation. This leaves a large
number of patients injured by a complex health care system without remedy. For a
defined schedule of medical injuries, compensation will be provided as scheduled
and announced. The list of injuries for which such a remedy is available has been
generally agreed upon as being not related to an underlying medical condition.
The development of a Patient‘s Compensation program such as described
here is modest in size and intent. Worker‘s Compensation also started modestly; a
1902 Maryland Accident Fund was established for miners but was ruled
unconstitutional.297 In 1908 Congress legislated an act for compensation to some
federal employees in 1908.298 The first law held constitutional was passed in New
Jersey and it was not until 1949 that all states passed Worker‘s Compensation
Insurance.299
In summary, from a patient‘s point of view, the medical and legal professions
can and should do better by those suffering the consequences of medical injury.
Just as Worker‘s Compensation insurance began on a voluntary basis and expanded
in scope slowly, state-by-state, a Patient‘s Compensation program would begin
much the same way. By limiting early claims experience to a scheduled set of
injuries, all of which are likely to generate little dispute as to whether or not the
injury is caused by medical care, the overhead costs of administration on a per case
basis are likely to decrease. Announcing the schedule to physicians and patients
alike in a comprehensive but understandable way will be critical to the provision of
fair and just compensation for those sustaining medical injury, negligent and nonnegligent alike.

296. See BAKER, supra note 32, at 173 (suggesting that few lawyers accept medical malpractice
cases that do not potentially have a damage award of at least $200,000). But see ROBERT ZAUSNER, TWO
BOYS DIVIDED BY FORTUNE, UNITED BY TRAGEDY: A TRUE STORY OF THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 45–46
(2009) (noting medical malpractice jury verdicts of between $19.9 million and $49.6 million returned
for plaintiffs by a successful Philadelphia law firm); BARRY WERTH, DAMAGES 294–96 (1999)
(documenting other large medical malpractice verdicts). See generally Orosco et al., Surgical
Malpractice in the United States, 1990–2006, 215 J. AM. COLL. SURGEONS 480, 482 (2012) (noting the
mean payment in 2006 was $262,727).
297. Arthur Larson, The Nature And Origins Of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206,
232 (1952).
298. Id.
299. Id. at 233 (stating that all but eight states had adopted the Compensation Acts by 1920 and that
Mississippi was the last state to do so in January, 1949).
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APPENDIX 1: SERIOUS REPORTABLE EVENTS IN HEALTH CARE—2011 UPDATE300
1. Surgical or Invasive Procedure Events
A. Surgery or other invasive procedure performed on the wrong site
B. Surgery or other invasive procedure performed on the wrong patient
C. Wrong surgical or other invasive procedure performed on a patient
D. Unintended retention of a foreign object in a patient after surgery or
other invasive procedure
E. Intraoperative or immediately postoperative/postprocedure death in an
ASA Class 1 patient
2. Product or Device Events
A. Patient death or serious injury associated with the use of contaminated
drugs, devices, or biologics provided by the healthcare setting
B. Patient death or serious injury associated with the use or function of a
device in patient care, in which the device is used or functions other than as
intended
C. Patient death or serious injury associated with intravascular air embolism
that occurs while being cared for in a healthcare setting
3. Patient Protection Events
A. Discharge or release of a patient/resident of any age, who is unable to
make decisions, to other than an authorized person
B. Patient death or serious injury associated with patient elopement
(disappearance)
C. Patient suicide, attempted suicide, or self-harm that results in serious
injury, while being cared for in a healthcare setting
4. Care Management Events
A. Patient death or serious injury associated with a medication error (e.g.,
errors involving the wrong drug, wrong dose, wrong patient, wrong time, wrong
rate, wrong preparation, or wrong route of administration)
B. Patient death or serious injury associated with unsafe administration of
blood products
C. Maternal death or serious injury associated with labor or delivery in a
low-risk pregnancy while being cared for in a healthcare setting
D. Death or serious injury of a neonate associated with labor or delivery in
a low-risk pregnancy
E. Patient death or serious injury associated with a fall while being cared
for in a healthcare setting

300. This appendix was adapted from NAT‘L QUALITY FORUM, supra note 180, at iii–iv.
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F. Any Stage 3, Stage 4, and unstageable pressure ulcers acquired after
admission/presentation to a healthcare setting
G. Artificial insemination with the wrong donor sperm or wrong egg
H. Patient death or serious injury resulting from the irretrievable loss of an
irreplaceable biological specimen
I. Patient death or serious injury resulting from failure to follow up or
communicate laboratory, pathology, or radiology test results
5. Environmental Events
A. Patient or staff death or serious injury associated with an electric shock
in the course of a patient care process in a healthcare setting
B. Any incident in which systems designated for oxygen or other gas to be
delivered to a patient contains no gas, the wrong gas, or are contaminated by toxic
substances
C. Patient or staff death or serious injury associated with a burn incurred
from any source in the course of a patient care process in a healthcare setting
D. Patient death or serious injury associated with the use of physical
restraints or bedrails while being cared for in a healthcare setting
6. Radiologic Events
A. Death or serious injury of a patient or staff associated with the
introduction of a metallic object into the MRI area
7. Potential Criminal Events
A. Any instance of care ordered by or provided by someone impersonating
a physician, nurse, pharmacist, or other licensed healthcare provider
B. Abduction of a patient/resident of any age
C. Sexual abuse/assault on a patient or staff member within or on the
grounds of a healthcare setting
D. Death or serious injury of a patient or staff member resulting from a
physical assault (i.e., battery) that occurs within or on the grounds of a healthcare
setting

